Affordances and the Body: An Intentional Analysis of Gibson's Ecological Approach to Visual Perception

Abstract

The concept of affordance is one of the most controversial and debated features of James J. Gibson's ecological approach to perception. With this concept Gibson offers a new approach to a knotty problem in perception theory; namely, the problem of accounting for meaning in perceptual experience. The controversial nature of the affordance concept stems largely from the fact of its growing out of an approach to perception that is a significant departure from standard formulations. The aims of this paper are two-fold. The first is to provide a detailed analysis of the concept of affordance, and in the process to draw out some of its implicit theoretical claims concerning the nature of perception. This analysis will be presented in the first part of the paper. Exploration of the implicit assumptions of the affordance concept will reveal the underlying intentional character of the ecological approach to perception.The second aim of the paper is to consider the applicability of the affordance concept to features of the human world whose meanings are sociocultural in origin. As will be clear shortly, affordances seem most plausibly applied to features of the environment that have species-specific or transcultural significance. However, the concept of affordance has sometimes been applied to features that have significance only within a particular sociocultural context. These applications have been a source of some debate. I will argue that this extension of the affordance concept is warranted once affordances are carefully grounded in an intentional analysis of perception. Moreover, the resolution of this controversy will provide the basis for maintaining the broad and fundamental character of affordances in perceptual experience. Toward these ends, we will examine in parts two and three of the paper some issues concerning intentionality in perception and its relationship to Gibson's ecological theory of perception.

An Outline of a Theory of Affordances

“…It is worthwhile to say a few things about previous attempts, in order to see what is different about the theory outlined here. Previous (post-Gibson) attempts to set out an ontology of affordances have typically assumed that affordances are properties of the environment (Heft, 1989(Heft, , 2001Michaels, 2000;Reed, 1996;Stoffregen, 2000;Turvey, 1992). These authors have agreed that affordances are animal-relative properties of the environment.…”

“…Another candidate for the aspect of animals to which affordances are relative is body scale. This view of affordances, endorsed by Heft (1989Heft ( , 2001, is suggested by empirical studies of affordances, which follow Warren's (1984) classic study of stair-climbing affordances in quantifying affordances with π numbers, ratios between measures of body scale, and measures of an environmental property. 2 I take it that this is the reason that Stoffregen's (2000) discussion of affordances focuses on their relation to body scale.…”

“…2 I take it that this is the reason that Stoffregen's (2000) discussion of affordances focuses on their relation to body scale. Heft (1989) provided a second reason for taking body scale to be the properties of animals to which the affordances of the environment are related. Understanding affordances as body-related, Heft (1989) suggested, can do justice to the phenomenological insights of Merleau-Ponty (1962) and the profound influence those insights had on Gibson. To summarize this brief discussion of some of the previous theoretical work on affordances, we can say the following: First, everyone agrees that affordances are animal-relative properties of the environment.…”

Affordances of Sensory Garden towards Learning and Self Development of Special Schooled Children

“…Potential affordances are different for each individual and each specific group of people, depending on how their physical a skills and bodily proportions, social needs and personal intentions are matched with the environmental features (Kytta, 2002(Kytta, , 2003(Kytta, , 2006. Heft (1989) suggests that potential affordances should be distinguished from actualized affordances. Kytta (2003:49) supported, 'potential affordances become qualities of the environment and the actualized affordances become individual relationships with the environment'.…”

What is the dynamical hypothesis?

“…Like van Gelder, we contend that natural intending agents are nothing when taken away from natural contexts (Gibson 1979). Computational accounts are "claustrophobic" in highlighting symbol manipulation, hypothetical internal representations, and mental processes in explanations of how intending agents acquire knowledge about their environments (Heft 1989;Reed 1993). Intentions toward environmental objects are to be understood in a biological context.…”