Aesthetic Self-Forgetfulness

Abstract

Intense aesthetic experiences are often described in terms of self-forgetfulness, where the perceiver becomes immersed in the aesthetic phenomenon to the extent of losing consciousness of being the subject of the experience. Although such experiences have been described from the early eighteenth century onwards, there is still a surprising lack of detailed investigation on the precise nature of aesthetic self-forgetfulness. What happens in this experience, and precisely what is the ‘self’ that is forgotten? Building on phenomenological theories of self-consciousness, I argue that aesthetic self-forgetfulness cannot be understood as an absolute eradication of the self, as a pre-reflective self-consciousness stays intact even in deeply immersive aesthetic experiences. Thus, I argue that talk of self-forgetfulness is to some extent misleading, and the changes in the subject’s self-relation during aesthetic experience is better understood in terms of an altered sense of agency.

ImGame Project

“…Thus, we see two modes of experience: a level of conscious reflection on the one hand; a psychological weightlessness, so to speak, or some wandering of the mind on the other because the subject has become a platform for the manifestation of the object and the subject's capacity to actively control the object is suspended. Mäcklin (2021) underlines that in the first mode, "I remain conscious of myself, but assume an observational stance," whereas in the second, "more intense mode," "I 'dissolve' or 'disappear' into the aesthetic object." Csikszentmihályi (1996) has pointed out that in this kind of experience, the subject acts effortlessly and automatically, yet it is a focused state of consciousness at the same time.…”

“…The double experience or shifting from being rational and partly "cast away" has been explicitly described by Harri Mäcklin, who stated that immersiveness is not a complete self-forgetfulness even for a short while, but rather, an altered state of the perceiver's involvement. The subject passively lets the artwork lead one's mind, but there is still a retrospective awareness of the self being a subject of the experience, even if the object has momentarily taken possession of the perceiver (Mäcklin, 2021). In his very interesting article, Mäcklin (2021) gives a hint that there are theoretically two modes of immersiveness: the self-consciousness must be intact to some extent because the subject registers its own state of self-forgetfulness during the aesthetic experience, but there is a feeling that the subject is floating in the atmosphere dictated by the object at the same time.…”

“…The subject passively lets the artwork lead one's mind, but there is still a retrospective awareness of the self being a subject of the experience, even if the object has momentarily taken possession of the perceiver (Mäcklin, 2021). In his very interesting article, Mäcklin (2021) gives a hint that there are theoretically two modes of immersiveness: the self-consciousness must be intact to some extent because the subject registers its own state of self-forgetfulness during the aesthetic experience, but there is a feeling that the subject is floating in the atmosphere dictated by the object at the same time. Thus, we see two modes of experience: a level of conscious reflection on the one hand; a psychological weightlessness, so to speak, or some wandering of the mind on the other because the subject has become a platform for the manifestation of the object and the subject's capacity to actively control the object is suspended.…”

Nurcholish Madjid's Multiperspective Neuroparaemiophenomenology of Love

“…Efforts are made to prevent self-awareness from becoming a problem. When it comes to the third form of selfforgetfulness, one must put one's own interests ahead of the needs of a lover or a friend (Mäcklin, 2021). This is the logical complement to hatred, sexual love, and personal love by linking different forms together, such as paper or bits of cloth.…”