1999
DOI: 10.2307/2991820
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Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive Branch Nominations 1885- 1996

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Cited by 144 publications
(189 citation statements)
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“…Whereas a president is expected to enjoy less power and influence over the Senate during an election year, presidents typically enjoy more influence during their honeymoon year than later in their term (McCarty and Razaghian 1999). Therefore, there may be an expected decrease in the likelihood of outsider testimony in hearings during the honeymoon year than during other points in the president's term due to an increase in presidential power.…”
Section: Independent Variablesmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Whereas a president is expected to enjoy less power and influence over the Senate during an election year, presidents typically enjoy more influence during their honeymoon year than later in their term (McCarty and Razaghian 1999). Therefore, there may be an expected decrease in the likelihood of outsider testimony in hearings during the honeymoon year than during other points in the president's term due to an increase in presidential power.…”
Section: Independent Variablesmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Presidents, in this view, pursue policy control above all else, strategies Moe reduces to two guiding propositions: presidents centralize policy decision making and politicize analytical and administrative resources. Two decades later the analysis serves as departure point for a substantial and growing body of scholarship (Dickinson 1996;Mayer 2001;McCarty and Razaghian 1999;Moe and Howell 1999;Ponder 2000;Rudalevige 2002;Weko 1995).…”
Section: Why Part? Two Questionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, the evidence supporting this contention is mixed. Some scholars have uncovered evidence that divided government is a significant component of executive branch and appeals courts confirmation delay (Binder & Maltzman, 2002;McCarty & Razaghian, 1999). Others have rejected divided government as a significant component of delay for nomination referrals from the Judiciary Committee (Allison, 1996;Hartley & Holmes, 1997) or for appointment delay for the FCC (Nixon, 2001).…”
Section: Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%