Adverse Selection, Repeated Insurance Contracts and Annoucement Strategy

Dionne, Georges; Lasserre, Pierre

doi:10.2307/2297743

Cited by 74 publications

(44 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…e.g. Dionne and Lasserre (1985). A model of health insurance contracts which may depend on past performance may indeed be an important extension of the present model.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Alternative health insurance schemes: a welfare comparison

Hansen

Keiding

2002

Journal of Health Economics

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“…e.g. Dionne and Lasserre (1985). A model of health insurance contracts which may depend on past performance may indeed be an important extension of the present model.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Alternative health insurance schemes: a welfare comparison

Hansen

Keiding

2002

Journal of Health Economics

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“…Both schemes have proven to be efficient for handling moral hazard and adverse selection (see Holmstrom, 1979;Shavell, 1979;Pauly, 1974;Stiglitz, 1976, for partial insurance, andChiappori et al, 1994;Dionne and Lasserre, 1985, for experience rating). A number of empirical tests have been proposed to measure the efficiency of such mechanisms for road safety (Sloan et al, 1995;Boyer and Dionne, 1989) or to measure the presence of residual asymmetric information problems in insurers' portfolios (Chiappori and Salanié, 2000;Dionne, Gouriéroux and Vanasse, 2001;Cohen and Siegelman, 2010;Dionne, Pinquet, Maurice and Vanasse, 2011a;Dionne, Michaud and Dahchour, 2011b).…”

Section: The Economics Of Incentives In Road Safety Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance

Dionne

Michaud²,

Pinquet

2013

Research in Transportation Economics

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Abstract:Road safety policies and automobile insurance contracts often use incentive mechanisms based on traffic violations and accidents to promote safe driving. Can these mechanisms improve road safety efficiently? Do they reduce asymmetric information between drivers and insurers and regulators? In other words, is there residual asymmetric information in observed distributions of accidents and infractions? We answer these questions in this chapter by reviewing recent theoretical and empirical results based on various data and methodologies. We present recent tests related to the identification of residual asymmetric information in road safety management and in automobile insurance contracting. We also propose a theoretical analysis of the foundations of point-record driver's licenses observed around the world.

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“…Voir également Wilson (1980), Fluet (1992), Dionne et Lasserre (1985, Chassagnon et Chiappori (1997), Stiglitz (1982), Hellwig (1987) et Fombaron (1997 fait qu'elle soit significative est dû à des non-linéarités non modélisées dans l'équation d'accidents. Ces non-linéarités peuvent être éliminées en augmentant les croisements entre les variables dans l'équation de choix de franchise, comme le font les assureurs lorsqu'ils écrivent leurs manuels de tarification.…”

Section: La Mesure De L'antisélection Résiduelle Dans Le Portefeuilleunclassified

La mesure empirique des problèmes d’information

Dionne¹

2009

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Nous abordons la difficile question de la mesure empirique des effets des problèmes d’information sur l’allocation des ressources. Deux problèmes retiennent notre attention; le risque moral et l’antisélection. Une conclusion, acceptée par la plupart des auteurs, est que les problèmes d’information créent des distorsions importantes dans l’économie. Mais nous pouvons vérifier, dans certains marchés, que des mécanismes efficaces ont été mis en place pour réduire ces distorsions et même éliminer, à la marge, des problèmes résiduels d’information. Cette conclusion semble plus forte pour l’antisélection que pour le risque moral. Une explication est le fait que l’antisélection concerne des caractéristiques exogènes, alors que le risque moral est expliqué par des actions endogènes qui peuvent être modifiées en tout temps.We discuss the difficult question of measuring the effects of asymmetrical information problems on resource allocation. Two problems are retained: moral hazard and adverse selection. One conclusion, shared by many authors, is that information problems introduce significant distortions in the economy. However, we can verify, in different markets, that efficient mechanisms have been introduced in order to reduce these distortions and even eliminate, at the margin, some residual information problems. This conclusion is stronger for adverse selection. One explanation is that adverse selection is related to exogenous characteristics while moral hazard is due to endogenous actions that may change at any point in time

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Adverse Selection, Repeated Insurance Contracts and Annoucement Strategy

Cited by 74 publications

References 8 publications

Alternative health insurance schemes: a welfare comparison

Alternative health insurance schemes: a welfare comparison

A review of recent theoretical and empirical analyses of asymmetric information in road safety and automobile insurance

La mesure empirique des problèmes d’information

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