2013
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-013-9173-1
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Adverse selection and growth under IMF programs

Abstract: The dominant approach to studying the effects of IMF programs has emphasized moral hazard, but we find that adverse selection has more impressive effects. We propose a novel strategic selection model to study the growth effects of IMF programs, which allows for the possibility of adverse selection. We find that adverse selection occurs: the countries that are most interested in participating in IMF programs are the least likely to have favorable growth outcomes. Controlling for this selection effect, we find t… Show more

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Cited by 47 publications
(24 citation statements)
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“…In terms of economic fundamentals, the focus of many such studies has been on economic growth. While some studies find a positive (Bas and Stone 2014) or insignificant (Atoyan and Conway 2006) relationship between IMF programs and growth, the majority of empirical studies suggest immediate negative effects (Barro and Lee 2005;Dreher 2006;Easterly 2005;Marchesi and Sirtori 2011;Przeworkski and Vreeland 2000). Beyond growth, monetary stability, debt management and the containment of external arrears are key goals of IMF programs (Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016).…”
Section: Adjustment Effectsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In terms of economic fundamentals, the focus of many such studies has been on economic growth. While some studies find a positive (Bas and Stone 2014) or insignificant (Atoyan and Conway 2006) relationship between IMF programs and growth, the majority of empirical studies suggest immediate negative effects (Barro and Lee 2005;Dreher 2006;Easterly 2005;Marchesi and Sirtori 2011;Przeworkski and Vreeland 2000). Beyond growth, monetary stability, debt management and the containment of external arrears are key goals of IMF programs (Kentikelenis, Stubbs, and King 2016).…”
Section: Adjustment Effectsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For these reasons, the Fund's engagement can positively affect expectations about the reforms' effects on sustainability and macroeconomic performance (Edwards 2006;Mody and Saravia 2006;Corsetti et al 2006;Morris and Shin 2006). 3 On the other hand, IMF programs may convey negative information (Andone and Scheubel 2017;Bas and Stone 2014;Ito 2012). If IMF programs are perceived as indicating that the country's financial problems are more severe than official indicators suggest, they can act as a negative signal.…”
Section: Signaling Effectsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A large body of quantitative research is devoted to understanding the consequences of IMF programs (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2009;Bas and Stone 2014;Dreher 2006;Nelson and Wallace 2017;Nooruddin and Simmons 2006;Oberdabernig 2013;Stubbs et al 2016). Most of this work has relied on a broad-brush binary indicator for whether or not a country is under a Fund program in a given year as a measure of the organization's engagement-plugging it into regression models and using it to differentiate control and treatment groups.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We account for a possible endogenous relationship between countries under World Bank PL and worsened rates of economic growth using an instrumental variable approach. In doing so, we follow the approach of studies that examined the impact of IMF lending on economic growth (Atoyan and Conway 2006;Bas and Stone 2014;Dreher 2006;Przeworski and Vreeland 2000;Vreeland 2003).…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…6 We are careful to include country, regional, and time fixed effects to limit the bias on our results from particular national economic shocks and regional economic changes, for example the 1997-1999 Asian financial crisis, as well as global economic changes such as the 2008 and 2009 recessions. In a recent study, Bas and Stone (2014) argue that countries that are more interested in participating in IMF programs are the least likely to have favorable growth outcomes. Their hypothesis, based on an adverse selection model, could also be tested in future studies in the context of World Bank PL.…”
Section: World Bank Institutional Reforms In the Late 1990smentioning
confidence: 99%