ADS-Bsec: A novel framework to secure ADS-B

Kacem, Thabet; Barreto, Alexandre; Wijesekera, Duminda; Costa, Paulo C. G.

doi:10.1016/j.icte.2017.11.006

Cited by 7 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…The testing should start from the development environment and extend to the operational environment, because development environments do not fully represent the proper use cases. Kacem et al [45] proposed a crypto and radio-location-based hybrid solution to thwart ADS-B attacks. Their proposed framework called ADS-Bsec provides authenticity and integrity for ADS-B packets by using a keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the (In)Security of 1090ES and UAT978 Mobile Cockpit Information Systems–An Attacker Perspective on the Availability of ADS-B Safety- and Mission-Critical Systems

Khandker¹,

Turtiainen²,

Costin³

et al. 2022

IEEE Access

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Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is a key air surveillance technology and a critical component of next-generation air transportation systems. It significantly simplifies aircraft surveillance technology and improves airborne traffic situational awareness. Many types of mobile cockpit information systems (MCISs) are based on ADS-B technology. MCIS gives pilots the flight and trafficrelated information they need. MCIS has two parts: an ADS-B transceiver and an electronic flight bag (EFB) application. The ADS-B transceivers transmit and receive the ADS-B radio signals while the EFB applications hosted on mobile phones display the data. Because they are cheap, lightweight, and easy to install, MCISs became very popular. However, due to the lack of basic security measures, ADS-B technology is vulnerable to cyberattacks, which makes the MCIS inherently exposed to attacks. Attacks are even more likely for the MCIS, because they are power, memory, and computationally constrained. This study explores the cybersecurity posture of various MCIS setups for both types of ADS-B technology: 1090ES and UAT978. Total six portable MCIS devices and 21 EFB applications were tested against radio-link-based attacks by transmission-capable software-defined radio (SDR). Packet-level denial of service (DoS) attacks affected approximately 63% and 37% of 1090ES and UAT978 setups, respectively, while many of them experienced a system crash. Our experiments show that DoS attacks on the reception could meaningfully reduce transmission capacity. Our coordinated attack and fuzz tests also reported worrying issues on the MCIS. The consistency of our results on a very broad range of hardware and software configurations indicate the reliability of our proposed methodology as well as the effectiveness and efficiency of our platform.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the (In)Security of 1090ES and UAT978 Mobile Cockpit Information Systems–An Attacker Perspective on the Availability of ADS-B Safety- and Mission-Critical Systems

Khandker¹,

Turtiainen²,

Costin³

et al. 2022

IEEE Access

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“…As one of the fundamental components of modern navigation systems, much research has been done and is still ongoing with respect to different aspects of ADS-B. This includes, but is not limited to, security and verification of messages [9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16] experimental attack analysis [17][18][19][20], data quality analysis [21][22][23][24][25], safety assessment [26,27], flight testing [21,28,29], etc. ADS-B security protocols have been a topic of many studies during the system evolution.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Various techniques were discussed to adopt while verifying original ADS-B messages. These include traditional Kalman filtering, group validation [10], cryptography [9,13,15,16], and identity-based signature with batch verification [30]. Each of the solutions is yet to be implemented in the real-time ADS-B network.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

UAT ADS-B Data Anomalies and the Effect of Flight Parameters on Dropout Occurrences

Tabassum

Semke

2018

Data

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An analysis of the performance of automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data received from the Grand Forks, North Dakota International Airport was carried out in this study. The purpose was to understand the vulnerabilities of the universal access transceiver (UAT) ADS-B system and recognize the effects on present and future air traffic control (ATC) operation. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) mandated all the general aviation aircraft to be equipped with ADS-B. The aircraft flying within United States and below the transition altitude (18,000 feet) are more likely to install a UAT ADS-B. At present, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and autonomous air traffic control (ATC) towers are being integrated into the aviation industry and UAT ADS-B is a basic sensor for both class 1 and class 2 detect-and-avoid (DAA) systems. As a fundamental component of future surveillance systems, the anomalies and vulnerabilities of the ADS-B system need to be identified to enable a fully-utilized airspace with enhanced situational awareness. The data received was archived in GDL-90 format, which was parsed into readable data. The anomaly detection of ADS-B messages was based on the FAA ADS-B performance assessment report. The data investigation revealed ADS-B message suffered from different anomalies including dropout, missing payload, data jump, low confidence data, and altitude discrepancy. Among those studied, the most severe was dropout and 32.49% of messages suffered from this anomaly. Dropout is an incident where ADS-B failed to update within a specified rate. Considering the potential danger being imposed, an in-depth analysis was carried out to characterize message dropout. Three flight parameters were selected to investigate their effect on dropout. Statistical analysis was carried out and the Friedman Statistical Test identified that altitude affected dropout more than any other flight parameter.

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“…As one of the fundamental components of modern navigation systems, much research has been done and is still going on different aspects of ADS-B. This includes, but is not limited to, security and verification of messages [9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16] experimental attack analysis [17][18][19][20] data quality analysis [21][22][23][24][25] safety assessment [26] [27], flight testing [21,28,29], etc. ADS-B security protocol have been a topic of many studies during the system evolution.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Various techniques were discussed to adopt while verifying original ADS-B messages. These include traditional Kalman filtering, Group Validation [10], cryptography [9,13,15,16], Identity-Based Signature with Batch Verification [30]. Each of the solutions is yet to be implemented in the real-time ADS-B network.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

UAT ADS-B Data Anomalies and the Effect of Flight Parameters on Dropout Occurrences

Tabassum

Semke

2018

Preprint

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An analysis of the performance of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data received from the Grand Forks, North Dakota International Airport was carried out in this study. The purpose was to understand the vulnerabilities of Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) ADS-B system and recognize the effects on present and future Air Traffic Control (ATC) operation. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) mandated all the General Aviation aircraft to be equipped with ADS-B. The aircraft flying within United States and below the transition altitude (18,000 feet) are more likely to install an UAT ADS-B. At present unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and autonomous air traffic control (ATC) towers are being integrated into the aviation industry and UAT ADS-B is a basic sensor for both class 1 and class 2 Detect and Avoid (DAA) systems. As a fundamental component of future surveillance system, the anomalies and vulnerabilities of ADS-B system need to be identified to enable a fully utilized airspace with enhanced situational awareness. The data received was archived in GDL-90 format, which was parsed into readable data. The anomaly detection of ADS-B messages was based on the FAA ADS-B performance assessment report. The data investigation revealed ADS-B message suffered from different anomalies including drop out; missing payload; data jump; low confident data and altitude discrepancy. Among those studied, the most severe was drop out and 32.49% of messages suffered from this anomaly. Dropout is an incident where ADS-B failed to update within a specified rate. Considering the potential danger being imposed, an in-depth analysis was carried out to characterize message dropout. Three flight parameters were selected to investigate their effect on drop out. Statistical analysis was carried out and Friedman Statistical Test identified that altitude affected drop out more than any other flight parameters.

show abstract

ADS-Bsec: A novel framework to secure ADS-B

Cited by 7 publications

References 8 publications

On the (In)Security of 1090ES and UAT978 Mobile Cockpit Information Systems–An Attacker Perspective on the Availability of ADS-B Safety- and Mission-Critical Systems

On the (In)Security of 1090ES and UAT978 Mobile Cockpit Information Systems–An Attacker Perspective on the Availability of ADS-B Safety- and Mission-Critical Systems

UAT ADS-B Data Anomalies and the Effect of Flight Parameters on Dropout Occurrences

UAT ADS-B Data Anomalies and the Effect of Flight Parameters on Dropout Occurrences

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