Administrative Accountability in the ‘Westminster’ Democracies: Towards a New Conceptual Framework

Abstract

Understandings of administrative accountability in the " Westminster" democracies remain too closely linked to the institutional arrangements through which accountability has traditionally been exacted in these countries. This has prevented a full appreciation of the nature and extent of changes which have been under way for some time. The article argues that a refined concept of accountability and five subordinate "conceptions" of accountability, corresponding to distinctive sets of institutional arrangements, are needed to comprehend the relevant changes. The identification of multiple options for administrative accountability, in turn, raises questions about how the different accountability systems are to be chosen and combined to maximize accountability without impairing administrative effectiveness.The modern debate about administrative accountability in countries with Westminster-derived governmental arrangements' is centered on the heavy reliance of those systems on a single principle of accountabilitynamely, the responsibility of ministers of state to parliament -and concern about the continuing ability of that principle to ensure democratic control of a large, active and increasingly complex executive branch of government. A range of viewpoints on the nature of the problem can be found in the literature, but for present purposes two main camps can be identified. The first camp emphasizes the continuing relevance of ministerial responsibility and urges all players to recommit themselves to the principle (Butler 1973;Jones 1987;Sutherland 1991). Part of the problem, it is argued, is that critics of the doctrine have placed too much emphasis on its supposed requirement that ministers accept liability for actions performed on their authority, whereas the more realistic requirement of answerability and rectification is all that is often needed. The second camp, to which a majority of academic commentators probably now belongs, argues that ministerial responsibility either is now incapable by itself of sustaining a system of administrative accountability or else is undesirable in this role because of its adverse effects on efficiency or on openness and responsiveness in government (Robinson et al. 1987). and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, 0x4, m, UK.

Trends in the Public Sector

“…The minister does remain accountable for policy matters, the choice of a quango and supervision of quangos. A limited ministerial responsibility is accompanied by fewer control mechanisms for ministers (Stone, 1995). Due to the mixed ownership of production rights, quangos are not public organizations in the traditional sense, as, for example, departmental units, although they do belong to the public domain.…”

“…patronage) can be viewed as a way of making quangos more accountable to the demands of citizens. Monitoring is, thus, replaced by 'accountability to the market', which is expected to ensure efficiency and reduce the need for monitoring by politicians (see Waldegrave, 1993;Stone, 1995).…”

Accountability challenges in public–private partnerships from a South African perspective

“…Some of the key institutional accountability structures that have been modified and built upon over the years are bureaucratic, political, legal, contractual, market, communal, managerial, professional, administrative and collaborative accountability mechanisms Sinclair, 1995;Stone, 1995;Deleon, 1998;Flinders, 2003;Mulgan, 2003;Dowdle, 2006;Mashaw, 2006;Scott, 2006;Boven and Schillemans, 2009;Koliba et al, 2011). For example, citizens in a democratic society have an obligation to hold elected officials accountable, through communal accountability, for the way in which they formulate and implement contracts and provide public goods and services.…”

Accountability as a Bureaucratic Minefield: Lessons from a Comparative Study

“…There is little doubt that the field of accountability has been substantially opened up to include a much wider range of grounds and opportunities for holding bureaucrats accountable. Moreover, there are some excellent classifications of forms and varieties of accountability mechanisms and processes (see Dubnick 2005;Stone 2005) -whether parliamentary committees, freedom of information, courts, the press or ministerial responsibility. Yet this source of strength also has weaknesses.…”