“…The embodied approach to language claims that the same neural structures involved in making sensory, motor, and even emotional experiences are also involved in understanding the linguistic material related to those experiences [ 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 ]. At least for language-expressing concrete content, such as nouns of graspable objects or action verbs, several experimental findings have supported this theoretical framework [ 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 ], for a review see [ 6 , 33 ] However, the embodiment provides less straightforward results in the domain of abstract concepts. Indeed, by definition, abstract concepts are far from actual experiences, so they can appear to be hardly rooted in the neural substrates subserving those experiences.…”