Adding Deleuze to the mix

Abstract

In this article I will suggest ways in which adding the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze to the mix can complement and extend the 4EA approach to cognitive science. In the first part of the paper, I will show how the Deleuzean tripartite ontological difference (virtual/intensive/actual) can provide an explicit ontology for dynamical systems theory. The second part will take these ontological notions and apply them to three areas of concern to the 4EA approaches: (a) the Deleuzean concept of the virtual will clarify the ontological status of perceptual capacity as sensorimotor skill; (b) the Deleuzean concept of "intensive individuation" will clarify the ontological status of the genesis of perceptually guided behavior; (c) the Deleuzean critique of confusing the actual and the virtual will enable us to intervene in the realism/idealism debate. These aspects will not be addressed sequentially but will be interwoven into an unfolding argument.

On the Utility of Virtuality for Relating Abilities and Affordances

“…Although the difference between possible and actual is one of existence, understood in this way, potential differs from actual only in terms of Downloaded by [Tano Posteraro] at 12:48 30 October 2014 employment, application, or exercise. And yet, to take a line from Protevi (2013), the virtual emphatically "does not resemble its actualization; there is nothing identical in its being-it is fully differential" (p. 143). But, afforded a differential definition, potentiality falls prey instead to the snare of teleology.…”

“…The animal's ability to climb only impacts the layout of its environment when exercised. "It is," in Protevi's (2013) words, "only these individuated actions that can change the web of relations structuring the intensive processes that integrate differential fields and produce action" (p. 152). There are two claims at work here: first, that the exercise of an ability is the actualization of a virtual field of relations, and second, that this field is comprised of elements impacted by actual activity.…”

“…"Our real acts," he writes, "are adjusted to our perceptions of the real relations [in the practical field], thereby providing a solution to the problem [of how to swim]" (p. 165). In order to successfully negotiate a practical field, "the trick," writes Protevi (2013) (p. 152). It is to synchronize the rate at which what one can do changes-how long can I hold my breath, how many strokes can I perform before needing rest, against how strong a current can I move, and so on-with changes in environmental affordances (strength of current, temperature of water).…”

“…Most significant is, however, the processually reciprocal nature of this relationship: the way changes in a layout of affordances imply correlative changes in the way capacities are actualized. But this is nowhere near as straightforward as its proponents suggest, for, as Protevi (2013) indicates, "only the act of climbing a tree, not the unactualized ability to climb, can knock some bark off the tree or strain a muscle" (p. 151).…”

Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making

“…DeLanda reads "nonsense" as one name for this operator. Despite its title, then, scholars such as DeLanda (2002), Protevi (2010), and Eleanor Kaufman (2012) (anticipated to some extent by Slavoj Žižek (2004)) have shown that The Logic of Sense is not primarily a work about, for example, propositional logic, at least not in isolation from larger questions of philosophical ontology. 12 See, for example, LS , p. 9/1: "Il appartient à l'essence du devenir d'aller, de tirer dans les deux sens à la fois" ("It belongs to the essence of becoming to go, to pull, in both directions ( sens ) at once").…”