Addiction, Weakness of the Will, and Relapse

Gjelsvik, Olav

doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173223.004

Cited by 12 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…However, while the fanatic's continued pursuit is driven by the strength of their desire to persist and a voluntary drive and commitment to persevere (Redden and Steiner, 2000) (i.e. affective commitment), an addict's continued consumption or pursuit of the object is perpetuated by a weakness, such as an involuntary loss of self-control (Gjelsvik, 1999;Glasser, 1976). We believe there is only a fine line between fanaticism and addiction (Chung et al, 2008) and that a consumer may move between fanaticism and addiction (and between the four quadrants in Figure 1) based on whether their pursuit of the object of fanaticism, at the specific point in time is motivated by their affective commitment to it (which constitutes fanaticism), or due to a loss of self-control (which constitutes addiction).…”

Section: Fanaticism and Other Intense Forms Of Consumer Attachments To Products/brandsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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et al. 2017

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“Fanaticism” and its cognates, “fan” and “fanatic,” have been defined in inconsistent, contradictory, and often, nondiscriminant ways across disciplines. Due to these problematic conceptualizations, and particularly the mixed yet growing state of the literature in marketing, there is a need to revisit the phenomenon. Through a comprehensive review and synthesis of the existing literature, this article identifies the key defining characteristics of consumer fanaticism (i.e. “affective commitment” and “extraordinary pursuit”) and presents a typology (consisting of four types of fanaticism, i.e. rewarding, destructive, stigmatized, and rogue) to demonstrate the socially situated and subjective nature of the fanatic label. In doing so, the authors advance current theorizing on this topic by explaining and resolving the conflicting and paradoxical perspectives that currently exist in the literature. The authors also present a framework that distinguishes consumer fanaticism from other forms of consumption. They propose a research agenda for future studies of consumer fanaticism and demonstrate its strong potential to contribute fresh insights into other marketing phenomena.

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Section: Fanaticism and Other Intense Forms Of Consumer Attachments To Products/brandsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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et al. 2017

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“…As Olav Gjelsvik pointed out, Davidson's concept allows for causal/irrational deviations from what is considered best, all things considered. In theory, there is no reason to expect any particular pattern in these causal/irrational deviations, which might favor a long-term perspective or a short-term one (Gjelsvik 1999). If we consider the two opposing actions of accepting or refusing a cigarette, we can see that the desires which would cause the action of smoking are largely present-oriented, while those causing the refusal of the cigarette are concerned with the future.…”

Section: Healthmentioning

confidence: 97%

A medicine of the person The philosophy

2021

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The World Health Organization claimed recently that improving patient adherence to long term therapies would be more benefi cial than any biomedical progress. First, however, we must understand its mechanisms. In this paper I propose a novel approach using concepts elaborated in a fi eld rarely explored in medicine, the philosophy of mind. While conventional psychological models (eg, the Health Belief Model) provide explanations and predictions which have only a statistical value, the philosophical assumption that mental states (eg, beliefs) are causally effi cient (mental causation) can provide the basis for a causal theory of health behaviors. This paper shows that nonadherence to long term therapies can be described as the medical expression of a philosophical concept, that is, weakness of will. I use philosophical explanations of this concept to suggest a mechanistic explanation of nonadherence. I propose that it results from the failure of two principles of rationality. First, a principle of continence, described by the philosopher Donald Davidson in his explanation of weakness of will. This principle exhorts us to act after having considered all available arguments and according to which option we consider best. However, patients conforming to this principle of continence should rationally be nonadherent. Indeed, when patients face a choice between adherence and nonadherence, they must decide, in general, between a large, but delayed reward (eg, health) and a small, but immediate reward (eg, smoking a cigarette). According to concepts elaborated by George Ainslie and Jon Elster, the force of our desires is strongly infl uenced by the proximity of reward. This inter-temporal choice theory on one hand, and the mere principle of continence on the other, should therefore lead to nonadherence. Nevertheless, adherence to long term therapies is possible, as a result of the intervention of an additional principle, the principle of foresight, which tells us to give priority to mental states oriented towards the future.

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“…In particular, the essay entitled "How is weakness of the will possible?" (Davidson, 1969(Davidson, , 1980a has attracted a great deal of attention and comment among philosophers (e.g., Bratman, 1979;Charlton, 1988;Elster, 1999;Gjelsvik, 1999;Glüer, 2011;Kennett, 2001;Kotatko, Pagin, & Segal, 2001). Davidson's essay will now be used to outline a possible solution to the particular problem mentioned at the beginning of this article: given the obviously intentional nature of what we call addictive behavior, what does it mean to say that someone is addicted?…”

Section: Donald Davidson On Weakness Of Willmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is addiction a myth? Donald Davidson’s solution to the problem of akrasia says not*

Heather

Segal

2015

IJADR

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An obvious problem for the concept of addiction is its portrayal as involving involuntary behavior in the face of the addict's intentional actions. This has led some writers to call addiction a myth and to describe the self-labeling of persons as addicts as an illustration of causal attribution. We argue that this position is seriously mistaken. We propose that it is possible to construct a meaningful concept of addiction without assuming it involves completely involuntary behavior and to do so within the language of agents engaging in intentional action. One way of doing so arises from the work of Donald Davidson (1917Davidson ( -2003, particularly his essay "How is weakness of the will possible?" (Davidson, 1969). Davidson proposes a solution to the classic philosophical problem (called the problem of akrasia or incontinence) of how it is logically possible for someone to perform an action against her better judgement, and his solution is relevant to an understanding of addiction (i.e., addiction is a class of akratic action). Thus, Davidson's solution to this philosophical problem is also an answer to the question of how it is possible to understand addiction without assuming it entails completely involuntary behavior. At the same time, Davidson's conclusion at the end of his essay-that the akrates cannot give a reason for preferring incontinent over continent action-suggests what addicts mean when they say they feel compelled to behave the way they do.

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Addiction, Weakness of the Will, and Relapse

Cited by 12 publications

References 0 publications

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A medicine of the person The philosophy

Is addiction a myth? Donald Davidson’s solution to the problem of akrasia says not*

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