Adapting to food safety crises: Interpreting success and failure in the Canadian response to BSE

Chen

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

2015

In order to prevent and control risk factors which harm the quality and safety of the food supply chain effectively and reduce the probability of food safety incidents, this paper investigated on some problems of the upstream and downstream enterprises of the food supply chain under the three different forms of cooperation based on the neoclassic economics and game theory method. These problems include the effectiveness of the quality and safety efforts, the profits, the effect of the losses that the food safety incidents caused on the quality efforts’ efficacy, and the social welfare comparison. Meanwhile, we constructed evolutionary game model to analyze the macro and micro factors that influenced the cooperation strategy and demonstrated the effect of diversity of decision-making parameters on evolution results based on numerical simulation. By the theoretical and simulation analysis, we found that (1) the quality efforts’ efficacy, the profits, the sensitivity coefficient of the quality efforts efficiency to the losses, and the social welfare without thinking about the externality all met their maximum under the full cooperation situation; (2) strengthening supervision over the source of the food supply chain can reduce the probability of food safety incidents; (3) macro and micro environment will be the important basis for companies’ decision-making on cooperation strategy in the food supply chain.

“…Let / = 0, / = 0; we can draw the evolutionary phase diagram of the game (Figure 9(a)) and work out the equilibrium points of the system equations that are (0, 0), (0, 1), (1,0)…”

Section: The Establishment Of the Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Establishment Of the Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Research on Cooperation Strategy of Enterprises’ Quality and Safety in Food Supply Chain

Chen

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

2015

“…In a complete food supply chain from suppliers to consumers, any illegal economic behaviors occur in any one of the links from the raw materials suppliers to the food retailers, which will cause different kinds of food safety risk. In fact, food safety risk incidents are caused by many factors, including the food markets failures which is from the food markets’ externality, and information asymmetry (Resende-Filho and Hurley 2012 ; Kim and Kim 2013 ; Jones and Davidson 2014 ; Fellmann et al. 2014 ; Zissis et al.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The spread model of food safety risk under the supply-demand disturbance

Chen

2016

SpringerPlus

In this paper, based on the imbalance of the supply-demand relationship of food, we design a spreading model of food safety risk, which is about from food producers to consumers in the food supply chain. We use theoretical analysis and numerical simulation to describe the supply-demand relationship and government supervision behaviors’ influence on the risk spread of food safety and the behaviors of the food producers and the food retailers. We also analyze the influence of the awareness of consumer rights protection and the level of legal protection of consumer rights on the risk spread of food safety. This model contributes to the explicit investigation of the influence relationship among supply-demand factors, the regulation behavioral choice of government, the behavioral choice of food supply chain members and food safety risk spread. And this paper provides a new viewpoint for considering food safety risk spread in the food supply chain, which has a great reference for food safety management.

“…The analysis reinforces previous insights about the timing and nature of policy learning after crisis (Birkland 1997;Jasanoff 2007;Kingdon 1997), and it also clarifies how regulatory regimes influence the management of an important yet understudied policy domain involving both public and private risk management schemes (Ansell and Baur 2018;Verbruggen and Havinga 2017). By contextualizing the observed policy responses within a broader range of plausible (yet unchosen) responses, the analysis exposes how food risks can be constructed as "non-problems" whose solutions fail to disrupt existing dynamics of technocratic governance (Baur 2021;DeLind and Howard 2008;Freudenburg 2000;Jones and Davidson 2014). Altogether, this paper aims to leverage multiple points of comparison (across nations, organizational contexts, and policy alternatives) to clarify how and when crises reshape national food policy.…”

mentioning

confidence: 98%

Policy responses to foodborne disease outbreaks in the United States and Germany

Meagher

2021

Agric Hum Values

This paper explores differences in national responses to foodborne disease outbreaks, addressing both the sources of policy divergence and their implications for public health and coordinated emergency response. It presents findings from a comparative study of two multi-state E. coli outbreaks, one in the United States (2006) and one in Germany (2011), demonstrating important differences in how risk managers understood and responded to each nation’s first major outbreak associated with fresh produce. Drawing on a qualitative analysis of 36 semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and hundreds of archival documents, this paper traces how social constructions of the E. coli risk interacted with organizational dynamics among state and industry actors to produce divergent policy outcomes: the U.S. outbreak was understood primarily as an agricultural problem that led to an industry-led agricultural solution, whereas the German outbreak was understood as a human disease problem that did not result in a substantial policy response once the acute health crisis passed. The paper concludes by discussing how these policy processes generate partial solutions to foodborne contamination that expose modern societies to systemic vulnerabilities.