Abstract-An ad hoc wireless network is an autonomous selforganizing system of mobile nodes connected by wireless links where nodes not in direct range communicate via intermediary nodes. Routing in ad hoc networks is a challenging problem as a result of highly dynamic topology as well as bandwidth and energy constraints. In addition, security is critical in these networks due to the accessibility of the shared wireless medium and the cooperative nature of ad hoc networks. However, none of the existing routing algorithms can withstand a dynamic proactive adversarial attack. The routing protocol presented in this work attempts to provide throughput-competitive route selection against an adaptive adversary. A proof of the convergence time of our algorithm is presented as well as preliminary simulation results.
I. BACKGROUNDThe basic service offered by every node in an ad-hoc network is that of routing packets from their source to their ultimate destination. In general, routing protocols are susceptible to a wide variety of attacks. For example, a malicious node may perform a denial of service attack by selectively jamming some areas of the network.A great deal of work has been done in terms of guaranteeing practical security considerations in existing network protocols. In practice, adversarial attacks observed and documented in ad hoc networks might not be overly sophisticated. The ease of access to the medium has allowed extremely basic attacks to cause a great deal of damage. Consequently, such attacks can be thwarted by simple yet effective methods.Existing work in the literature considered a number of strong adversary models. For example, [1] considers a random fault pattern; [2] deals with a static fault pattern and [3] deals with an oblivious (non-adaptive) pattern.Our goal is to design routing protocols for networks that are provably tolerant of arbitrary adaptive DOS attacks. The adversary that we will consider selectively attacks packets on a given node or link. This adversary benefits from knowledge of the traffic pattern (including packet contents); this includes all current traffic and all past traffic history.As a result, the algorithms and analysis techniques used in the previous work will not apply. Existing methods that do not ignore sophisticated adaptive attacks either use brute force (flooding) or assume the existence of some trusted servers or routers. We do not wish to make such restrictive assumptions. As a result, the task of designing a throughput-competitive routing algorithm is much harder.It may appear that our adversarial routing model may lead to impractical algorithms in benign (non-adversarial) settings. However, routing algorithms similar to the one studied here were developed and tested in real network environments by British Telecomm and NTT for both wired and wireless networks with superior results Our contribution: We propose a new algorithm for adaptively selecting routing paths in a network with dynamic adversarial edge failures, and we give a rigorous mathematical analysis of...