Adam Smith's Industrial Organization of Religion: Explaining the Medieval Church's Monopoly and Its Breakdown in the Reformation

Adam Smith's Theory of Violence and the Political-Economics of Development

“…Smith suggests three necessary conditions for the growth of towns following the political exchange with the king. These features of town organization reflect the creation of market infrastructure that constitute "the economic role of political institutions" (Weingast 1995). The first required that the town became capable of providing for its security.…”

“…The natural state bargaining setting requires regular adjustment of the rules and privileges to changing circumstances. The failure of perpetuity and impersonality, in turn, meant the absence of the rule of law in natural states (Weingast 2010). Needless to say, this world was poor, violent, and undeveloped.…”

“…Although Smith does not explain how, the system of liberty provided for perpetuity and impersonality (at least for the elite), two critical ingredients in the rule of law and the doorstep conditions that represent important elements of the political economics of development (Weingast 2010). Liberty also provided merchants with the incentives to specialize, to engage in longdistance trade, and to accumulate capital.…”

“…On the institutions and organizations of the medieval church, see Ekelund, Hébert, and Tollison (2006). In Weingast (2017), I explain Smith's approach to how the church contributed to the stability of the no-growth feudal equilibrium. See also Hont (2009, 164).…”

Adam Smith's Constitutional Theory

“…Smith also studies the question of how liberty emerged in the feudal world, both through the rise of towns (which escaped the no-growth, feudal equilibrium) and the demise of the Catholic Church's monopoly on religious services. I study Smith's ideas on these topics inWeingast (2017aWeingast ( , 2017b respectively. This paper focuses on the constitutional institutions necessary to sustain liberty in a polity that has established it.…”