2022
DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2022.2134810
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Ad-hoc Security Initiatives, an African response to insecurity

Abstract: This article contends that Ad-hoc Security Initiatives (ASI) have developed over the last decade in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin and represents a new form of African collective security mechanism. The G5 Sahel Force and the Multi-National Joint Task Force emerged from a context-specific need for small clusters of African states to respond collectively to a shared cross-border security threat(s). The existing African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) mechanisms were not specific and responsive enough to m… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(2 citation statements)
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References 26 publications
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“…The AU has moved to institutionalise its AU PoC doctrine within PSOs, but this is yet to transfer to newly formed African-led PSOs conducted by the RECs/RMs or member states. For example, there has been a growing trend across the continent to move away from large-scale PKO and AU PSO to coalitions of the willing, labelled Ad-hoc Security Initiatives (ASIs) such as: (1) the AU-authorised Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord's Resistance Army, RCI-LRA (2011-2019); (2) the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, MNJTF (2015-ongoing) (MNJTF, 2022); and (3) the G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S) (2017-ongoing) (UN, 2021; de Coning et al, 2022). However, there is no specific PoC policy for each mission, despite the AU providing support to these missions.…”
Section: Somaliamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The AU has moved to institutionalise its AU PoC doctrine within PSOs, but this is yet to transfer to newly formed African-led PSOs conducted by the RECs/RMs or member states. For example, there has been a growing trend across the continent to move away from large-scale PKO and AU PSO to coalitions of the willing, labelled Ad-hoc Security Initiatives (ASIs) such as: (1) the AU-authorised Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord's Resistance Army, RCI-LRA (2011-2019); (2) the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, MNJTF (2015-ongoing) (MNJTF, 2022); and (3) the G5 Sahel Joint Force (FC-G5S) (2017-ongoing) (UN, 2021; de Coning et al, 2022). However, there is no specific PoC policy for each mission, despite the AU providing support to these missions.…”
Section: Somaliamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Establishing the G5 Sahel was instrumental in Chad's acquiring a more central position in global and regional initiatives and contributed around 1200 forces to fight rebel groups. 83 The Chadian army also included combat forces which signalled Chad's return to the fold of the EU Sahel initiatives and the regional Joint Military Staff Committee of the Sahel Region, allowing Chad to receive additional military resources. Nonetheless, with Mali's withdrawal from the force, questions were raised over jf-g5s's regional ownership and sustainability.…”
Section: Building Déby's Forcesmentioning
confidence: 99%