Actually Knowing

Knowledge and luck

“…(It is important to note that disrupting the initial truth-maker does not automatically make the belief false, for it could turn out that some other state of affairs could serve as a backup truth-maker.) Many researchers have claimed that the luck involved with such disruption and replacement-by-backup prevents one from knowing (Lehrer, 1965;Sosa, 2007), but this verdict has been disputed (Hetherington, 1998(Hetherington, , 1999(Hetherington, , 2013Sartwell, 1991Sartwell, , 1992Starmans & Friedman, 2012). To test which side of the dispute better captures the ordinary view of knowledge, we compared rates of knowledge attributions in response to three different stories in a between-subjects experiment.…”

Um problema para a epistemologia anti-sorte de Pritchard

“…10 A tese de que conhecimento é incompatível com crença verdadeira com sorte epistêmica, embora predominante, não é unânime. Uma divergência importante pode ser encontrada em Hetherington (1998Hetherington ( , 2001). …”

Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology

“…Stephen Hetherington has defended what he calls the Knowing Luckily Proposal, which amounts to the denial of the anti-luck platitude ( [Hetherington 2005] introduces the proposal under this label; see also [Hetherington 1998], and [Hetherington 2001] Chapter 3 for versions of this proposal). The claim is that while most knowledge is not had through luck, some of it can be.…”

“…While this option has had few advocates, it is an important option that needs to be considered. Stephen Hetherington, the principal champion of the view, calls this the 'Knowing Luckily Proposal' [Hetherington 2005]; see also [Hetherington 1998], [Hetherington 2001] and [Hetherington forthcoming]. If this provocative and original proposal is correct, it would call for a major re-evaluation and re-orientation of post-Gettier analytic epistemology, since much of it assumes the antiluck platitude both in elucidating the concept of knowledge 10 , and in the application of such accounts to central philosophical problems, such as scepticism.…”