Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining: How Internal Divisions Generate Civil Conflict

Abstract

Wars within states have become much more common than wars between them. A dominant approach to understanding civil war assumes that opposition movements are unitary, when empirically, most of them are not. I develop a theory for how internal divisions within opposition movements affect their ability to bargain with the state and avoid conflict. I argue that more divided movements generate greater commitment and information problems, thus making civil war more likely. I test this expectation using new annual data on the internal structure of opposition movements seeking self-determination. I find that more divided movements are much more likely to experience civil war onset and incidence. This analysis suggests that the assumption that these movements are unitary has severely limited our understanding of when these disputes degenerate into civil wars.

Dynamics and Logics of Civil War

“…5 Other factors that are endogenous to conflict include the number of parties involved and external intervention. David Cunningham (2006) and Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham (2013) find that the former increases conflict duration by raising uncertainty and exacerbating commitment problems. There is a rich empirical literature that examines the consequences of third-party intervention, focusing, for the most part, on peacekeeping missions.…”

Rethinking Ripeness Theory: Explaining Progress and Failure in Civil War Negotiations in the Philippines and Colombia

“…It adds to an existing literature that has revisited ripeness theory (Kloeiber 1994;Aggestam 2004;Pruitt 2005;O'Kane 2006, Amer 2007, Kreutz 2012Urlacher 2013). It also ties in with a growing literature on rebel group fragmentation and its effects on conflict processes (Kenny 2010;Asalm et al 2012;Cunningham 2006;Pearlman & Cunningham 2012;Bakke et al 2012;Cunningham 2013). Finally, the article provides qualitative evidence of internal dynamics inside rebel groups in a scholarship that is Walch International Negotiation 21 (2016) 75-103 mostly quantitatively orientated, responding to a call from previous research to explore these complicated dynamics and concepts through case studies (c.f.…”

“…It is rather rare that groups are totally unitary; instead, each side in the conflict is often moved by different groups and opinions (Stedman 1991;Zartman 1995;Zartman 2000;Cunningham 2013). Stedman refers to those actors as inside spoilers, especially when they use violence to derail the negotiation process (1997).…”

“…Looking at civil war onset, Cunningham (2013: 663) argues that internal divisions inside rebel groups "create greater information and credibility problems, leading to more frequent bargaining break-down and violent conflict". For example, it creates uncertainty over the application of potential agreement as rebel capacities and preferences are unclear (Cunningham 2013).1 For rebel leaders, negotiations with the government represent a double challenge: on one side, they need to convince their own ranks, and on the other they need to bargain strategically against the government (Lilja 2010). The leaders of the group need to keep convincing the other member of the group of the importance of the peace process.…”

Civilianizing Civil Conflict: Civilian Defense Militias and the Logic of Violence in Intrastate Conflict

“…Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012;Cunningham 2013Cunningham , 2014Staniland 2012Staniland , 2014. By highlighting the role of civilian collaborators in the maintenance of political order, we also speak to ongoing debates concerning the use of social networks in imperial conquest (e.g.…”