Acquiescing to intuition in individuals prone to delusions: Alterations in dual processes and cognitive control

Abstract

Delusions are aberrant beliefs that are maintained in the face of conflicting evidence. Promising mechanistic frameworks are suggested by cognitive control theory which delineates detection and resolution stages of conflict processing and an augmented dual-process framework which proposes acquiescence to intuitive beliefs despite awareness that they conflict with rationality. We measured intuitive processes using one-shot decision-making and analytic processes using cognitive reflection (CRT) and Stroop tasks. Higher intuitive strength and lower CRT/Stroop conflict resolution was associated with increased acquiescence. Importantly, those less prone to delusions were more likely to override a strong irrational intuition as their analytic strength (on CRT and Stroop) increased; however, in those high on delusion-proneness, analytic strength predicted an increased likelihood of acquiescing to intuition. These findings highlight an interactive role of intuitive and analytic processes such that those prone to delusions may tend to rally cognitive resources to rationalize their intuitions.