Achieving high tempo new challenges

Mind over matter? Multinational naval interoperability during Operation Iraqi Freedom

“…To fail to achieve and maintain such compatibilityboth technical and doctrinalis not only to detract from the overall military capability of a coalition or alliance, but also to detract from the value accorded as a partner, and from the influence which can thereby be wielded. 36 Intelligence sharing was particularly troublesome during Operation Allied Force in 1999 and problems persisted despite some progress in the wake of that operation. A review of operational level interoperability between the Australian and US militaries lamented in 2004: "There is no institutionalized digital network and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for Steven Paget Forthcoming in Defense & Security Analysis, 36:1, 2020.…”

Defence Policy under the Labour Government: Operational Dynamism and Strategic Inertia

“…As Alex Danchev (1998, 33–35) and Sir John Kiszely (1998) demonstrate, the core features of the Manoeuvrist Approach can be traced back to Sun Tzu, but also to the British theorist J. F. C. Fuller (1928), and the ‘indirect approach’ of Basil Liddell Hart (1929). It was not, however, until the mid‐1970s that Manoeuvre theory was revised (Kiszely 1999, 37) and the principle of Manoeuvre Warfare and its associated concept of Mission Command was only formally adopted in place of Montgomery's ‘Set‐Piece Battle’ by the British military in 1987 (Kiszely 1999). This relatively recent adoption of the Manoeuvrist Approach by the British casts some doubt on the depth of the concept's cultural ‘roots’ (Melvin 2002, 39; Storr 2003, 119–121) 44…”