Accuracy and the Laws of Credence

Pettigrew, Richard

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732716.001.0001

Cited by 281 publications

(251 citation statements)

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“…Looking into the future, pulling strands from both approaches together appears to have the potential to be beneficial for both approaches. Generally speaking, extending Richard Pettigrew's Epistemic Utility Theory Programme [42,48] to statistical SRs appears to be a research avenue holding great promise. We thus hope for many more exciting entries to be added to Table 1.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Probabilism, entropies and strictly proper scoring rules

Landes

2015

International Journal of Approximate Reasoning

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Probabilism, entropies and strictly proper scoring rules

Landes

2015

International Journal of Approximate Reasoning

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“…I have no quarrel with this thought, so long as, again, we do not conflate the question of what attitude-forming mechanisms and procedures ought to be adopted with the question of what attitudes are rational. Note that this is not to take a stand on the attractiveness of an 'accuracy-first' approach to epistemic rationality, along the lines of Pettigrew (2016). Accuracy-first theorists typically to use accuracy dominance and expected accuracy considerations to justify epistemic principles.…”

Section: Operationalizability and Guidancementioning

confidence: 99%

Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality

Hedden

2018

Philos Phenomenol Research

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If groups can have beliefs and other attitudes of their own, what determines which such attitudes the group rationally ought to have? A widespread presupposition is that group-level beliefs should be a function of the beliefs of the group's members, and similarly for other attitudes. But a host of impossibility theorems show that no such aggregation function can satisfy intuitively attractive constraints while ensuring coherent group-level attitudes. I argue that this presupposition is false. Group-level attitudes should be a function of group-level reasons (evidence, in the epistemic case), not individual-level attitudes. This allows for a theory of group rationality that (i) bypasses a host of pessimistic results in the literature on judgment aggregation and (ii) treats rational individual-level attitudes and rational group-level attitudes in parallel.

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“…23 According to the standard measures of inaccuracy that do take into account falsity distributions, such as the Brier rule and the spherical rule, symmetric distributions are (ceteris paribus) more accurate. 24 Not every signal sent at this equilibrium is deceptive. For instance, M2 sent in S2 is not even misleading.…”

Section: Possible Objectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%