Accumulating Trouble: Complex Organization, a Culture of Silence, and a Secret Spill

Beamish, Thomas D.

doi:10.2307/3097131

Cited by 45 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…This question points to the seriousness of communicative dynamics at play in organizations and even embedded in silence. Whether or not one confronts unethical behavior(s) could lead to the persistence or negation of that particular or other similar unethical acts (e.g., Beamish, 2000). Here, even silence is conceived of as a cultural artifact that communicates values and assumptions.…”

Section: Communication and Unethical Behaviormentioning

confidence: 97%

Hierarchical Mum Effect: A New Investigation of Organizational Ethics

Ploeger

Kelley

Bisel

2011

Southern Communication Journal

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In this language production experiment, working adults (N ¼ 226) were asked to respond to unethical business requests. Our objective was to advance a communicative understanding of unethical organizational behaviors by analyzing the linguistic adjustments workers employ to deny unethical requests. Specifically, we measured responses to unethical requests on a continuous coding scheme, which captured degrees of denial directness. We hypothesized that command structures produce a hierarchical mum effect in which subordinates are more indirect in denying an unethical request than supervisors and coworkers. Results confirmed the presence of a hierarchical mum effect; data also indicated that females, younger workers, and those with the least work experience are most indirect in denying an unethical request.

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Section: Communication and Unethical Behaviormentioning

confidence: 97%

Hierarchical Mum Effect: A New Investigation of Organizational Ethics

Ploeger

Kelley

Bisel

2011

Southern Communication Journal

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“…It has been implicated in the failure of change management programs (Beer and Nohria, 2000) and managers' negative attitudes to change (Bowen and Blackmon, 2003). It is also seen as compromising the innovative spirit (Edmondson, 2003;Nemeth, 1997); blocking critiques of management practice (Perlow and Williams, 2003;Shaw, 1981); and maintaining illegal practices (Beamish, 2000). The list goes on.…”

Section: Sister Silencementioning

confidence: 97%

“…Work hierarchies then absolve employees from any moral culpability; particularly those lower ranked workers close to the wrongdoing action (Beamish, 2000).…”

Section: Sister Silencementioning

confidence: 99%

Brother Secret, Sister Silence: Sibling Conspiracies Against Managerial Integrity

Maria

2006

J Bus Ethics

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I offer a new cartography of ethical resistance. I argue that there is an uncharted interaction between managerial secrecy and organizational silence, which may exponentially increase the incidence of corruption in ways not yet understood. Current methods used to raise levels of moral conduct in business and government practice appear blind to this powerful duo. Extensive literature reviews of secrecy and silence scholarships form the background for an early stage conceptual layout of the co-production of secrecy and silence. Copyright Springer 2006organizational silence, secrecy, ethical resisters,

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“…Empirical studies of business organizations' (non-)reporting behavior have also shown that businesses would often develop strategies to hide from the regulator's gaze, even when they concede to disclose some information on their operations (e.g. Beamish 2000;Carson 1983;Lee 2010;Pfaff and Sanchirico 2004;Shah 1996;Unger and van Waarden 2009).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Even though they are not a novelty among tools of information gathering (self-reporting rules are an old feature in tax regulation, occupational health and safety regulation, environmental regulation, or pharmaceuticals regulation; e.g. Beamish 2000;Carpenter 2010, chap. 9), self-reporting rules have gained increasing support in the last two decades, particularly in the United States (e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Politics of Detection in Business Regulation

Étienne

2014

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

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Detecting non-compliant behaviors is an important step in the enforcement of regulations. The literature on the subject is vast yet also narrow in its approach, in the sense that it has built on the assumption that regulators would always want to maximize information quantity and quality, while acting under two fundamental constraints: the regulator's resources, and the information asymmetry between regulator and regulatee. This article argues that regulatory agencies might not always want to maximize information: rather, other bureaucratic goals and concerns might shape detection preferences and toolsof detection in what might seem to be unexpected and irrational ways. To support this argument, the article presents a case study of the regulation of industrial risks in France, which focuses on the detection of incidents -small losses of control -taking place in high hazard sites. The study presents a rich set of observations. It finds regulators sharing with regulatees a restrictive interpretation of incident reporting obligations. It identifies also a range of third party informants -employees -who have been 2 neither solicited by regulators to contribute to detecting incidents, nor have been particularly well received by them when they have done so. The motives of regulators that can account for these detection preferences are mixed, but an overarching one appears to be their concerns for reputational risk. Seen through such a lens, certain types of incidents and certain tools of detecting them appeared either unimportant, or on the contrary as deserving attention and effort. On the basis of the case study and other empirical illustrations found in the literature, the article then offers a more general argument about how bureaucratic reputation may shape detection practices in business regulation.

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Accumulating Trouble: Complex Organization, a Culture of Silence, and a Secret Spill

Cited by 45 publications

References 33 publications

Hierarchical Mum Effect: A New Investigation of Organizational Ethics

Hierarchical Mum Effect: A New Investigation of Organizational Ethics

Brother Secret, Sister Silence: Sibling Conspiracies Against Managerial Integrity

The Politics of Detection in Business Regulation

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