Accounting Frauds and Main-Bank Monitoring in Japanese Corporations

Abstract

This study examines whether the delegated monitoring of main banks effectively decreases severe agency problems. For example, this includes accounting fraud in bank-dominated corporate governance. In this context, the fraud triangle specifies the three main factors of opportunity, incentive, and rationalization. Main banks may reduce the factor of opportunity through actions such as monitoring, which plays a moderating role by reducing the potential for managerial misconduct, whereas, the incentive factor may be enhanced through the subsequent pressure that influences managers to force turnover when they do not repay debts. The potential influence that the main banks have on the fraud rationalization factor may be stronger in firms that are more dependent on main-bank borrowing. This study analyzed data from publicly listed firms in Japan for the period between 2008 and 2016 to determine how main-bank relationships affected accounting fraud, thus allowing an assessment of delegated monitoring practices. Findings showed that main-bank relationships were helpful for reducing accounting fraud, suggesting its overall effectiveness in delegated monitoring. Results also showed that large audit firms did not necessarily prevent accounting fraud, which implies that main banks can employ their own monitoring as a substitute for the roles typically played by these firms. Here, the main policy implication is that main-bank relationships may strengthen business ethics in the context of bank-dominated corporate governance. In conclusion, the continued analysis of bank monitoring may benefit stakeholders while strengthening business ethics in bank-centered economies.

The Board Structure and Performance in IPO Firms: Evidence from Stakeholder-Oriented Corporate Governance

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