Accounting for family background when designing optimal income taxes: a microeconometric simulation analysis

Aaberge, Rolf; Colombino, Ugo

doi:10.1007/s00148-010-0331-y

Cited by 25 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…Some authors start from a specific fairness notion, derive the corresponding social ordering and characterise or simulate optimal income tax schemes; see, e.g. , Schokkaert et al (2004), Maniquet (2006, 2007), Luttens and Ooghe (2007), Jacquet and Van de gaer (2011) and Aaberge and Colombino (2012). Other authors study the consequences of introducing preference heterogeneity directly in the optimal (utilitarian) income tax literature; see, Boadway et al (2002), Kaplow (2008), Chon e and Laroque (2010) and Lockwood and Weinzierl (2012).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Fair and Efficient Taxation under Partial Control

Ooghe

Peichl

2014

Econ J

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. di¤erences. We discuss …rst the general properties of fair and e¢ cient tax-bene…t schemes. Next, we study two special cases-income taxation and tagging-in detail.Finally, we derive testable conditions for the general case and discuss the empirical implementation.JEL codes: D6, H2, I3

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confidence: 99%

Fair and Efficient Taxation under Partial Control

Ooghe

Peichl

2014

Econ J

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“…Previous examples of applications of the Equality of Opportunity (EOp) framework for the evaluation of different tax systems can be found in Roemer et al (2003) and in Aaberge and Colombino (2012). Roemer et al (2003) propose an optimal tax scheme model which is used as benchmark to evaluate which income-tax regime is able to equalize the opportunities in the income distribution within eleven European countries.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Roemer et al (2003) propose an optimal tax scheme model which is used as benchmark to evaluate which income-tax regime is able to equalize the opportunities in the income distribution within eleven European countries. Aaberge and Colombino (2012) propose a secondbest analysis and, by using a rich microsimulation model taylored on the Italian income tax, estimate the optimal taxation for both the utilitarian and the opportunity egalitarian criteria 1 . Although close in spirit to these papers, our work presents a distinctive feature: while their models are framed into the optimal income tax modelà la Mirlees, we use a partial dominance approach, which is more in line with the social choice tradition and allows for a more robust ethical assessment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The first step in our analysis consists in building a social welfare function expressing our ethical 1 concerns. Now, the two basic principles of fairness in the theory of taxation are horizontal equity, prescribing the 'equal treatment of equals' (Musgrave 1959) 2 , and vertical equity, prescribing the 'differential treatment of unequals'. From the opportunity egalitarian viewpoint the variable in terms of which the individuals should be considered as equals, hence deserving equal treatment, or unequals, hence deserving some equalizing treatment, is their set of opportunities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Income Taxation and Equity: New Dominance Criteria and an Application to Romania

2014

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractThis paper addresses the problem of the normative evaluation of income tax systems and income tax reforms. While most of the existing criteria, framed in the utilitarian tradition, are uniquely based on information about individual incomes, this paper, building upon the opportunity egalitarian theory, proposes new equity criteria which take into account also the socio-economic characteristics of individuals. Suitable dominance conditions that can be used to rank alternative tax systems are derived by means of an axiomatic approach. Moreover, the theoretical results are used to assess the redistributive effects of an hypothetical tax reform in Romania through a microsimulation analysis.JEL classification: D63, E24, O15, O40.

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“…If externalities exist, then there is a role for government to subsidise or tax these activities à la Pigou (1920) to restore e¢ ciency. If there exist tags-observable, usually exogenous factors that correlate with unobserved abilities or 1 See also the comment on Alesina and Angeletos (2005) by Di Tella and Dubra (2013) and the reply by Alesina et al (2013). tastes-then di¤erentiating the tax-bene…t system on the basis of these tags (sometimes called tagging) can also enhance e¢ ciency; see Akerlof (1978) for his seminal contribution. 2 The optimal income tax treatment of family size and couples also received considerable attention; see, e.g., Mirrlees (1972) and Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) for initial contributions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fair and Efficent Taxation Under Partial Control

Ooghe

Peichl

2013

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp14002.pdf Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar. Terms of use: Documents inDis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. in abilities, while at the same time preserving well-being di¤erences caused by taste di¤erences. We discuss …rst the general properties of fair and e¢ cient tax-bene…t schemes. Next, we study two special cases-income taxation and tagging-in detail.Finally, we derive testable conditions for the general case and discuss the empirical implementation.JEL codes: D6, H2, I3

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Accounting for family background when designing optimal income taxes: a microeconometric simulation analysis

Cited by 25 publications

References 32 publications

Fair and Efficient Taxation under Partial Control

Fair and Efficient Taxation under Partial Control

Income Taxation and Equity: New Dominance Criteria and an Application to Romania

Fair and Efficent Taxation Under Partial Control

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