Accounting and networks of corruption

Theorizing Financial Crimes as Moral Actions

“…Within this imputed form of naturalness and normality, and in line with the critical accounting literature on the individual's choice to offend (Greve et al, 2010;Power et al, 2013;Cooper et al 2013;Choo & Tan, 2007;Power et al, 2013), people's crime propensities are triggered into action by interacting with moral rules and levels of sanctions that exacerbate their moral vulnerability (Ashforth & Anand, 2003;Lokanan, 2015b, Murphy & Free, 2016Ramamoorti, 2008). As was highlighted in various testimonies to the PCBS, circumventing these rules becomes part of the game (Braithwaite, 2013), in that they do not appear to be complex (Neu et al, 2013b), and, as such, the rule violation occurs on a routine basis (Ashforth & Anand, 2013) and their enforcement becomes so taken-for-granted that they do not merit any serious attention (Williams, 2013;Sikka, 2015).…”

“…In the final analysis, there is ample evidence to suggest that individuals who break the rules are exposed to experiences that make them susceptible (to crime-related) moral influences from the setting they are a part thereof. This follows a theoretical tack that action-relevant features of the setting are shaped and informed by pervasive contextual factors that contribute to the propensities of individuals to circumvent rules governing their behaviour (Cooper et al, 2013;Donegon & Gagon, 2008;Gabbioneta et al, 2013;Neu et al, 2013b).…”

Government accounting reform in an ex-French African colony: The political economy of neocolonialism

“…Procurement, through inflated contracts and prices of supplies, fake missions, forged contracts and invoices, and sometimes the 'skilful use' of accounting, enables leaders to divert public monies for personal and political use (Dye, 2007;Neu et al, 2013). Officials used ASTUC to divert funds through manipulated contract prices and related activities.…”

“…lay not with the accounting programme per se -it can pre-set the format of accounting entries -but in the operating environment and human involvement. Discrete collaboration (or collusion) within networks of bureaucrats and politicians, and skilful use of accounting can mask the real nature of transactions that benefit actors' private interests (Neu et al, 2013). An efficient accounting system; whether ASTUC, BFANCE or another; cannot wholly eliminate errors and account manipulation, and thence fraud and corruption.…”

Does Multi-Attribute Bidding in Public Construction Projects Prevent Corruption while Tenderers’ Preferences are Open? A Study of China’s Practice

“…Such accountability requires a credible sanctioning system in case of violations of rules with adequate internal controls and audit procedures; a complaints system for bidders as well as appropriate administrative; and judicial review bodies attributed with the authority 8344 to impose corrective measures' ' (European Commission, 2013:260). In line with this recommendation, numerous studies have focused on examining the ethics-related aspects of corruption, particularly regarding bribery (Cleveland et al 2009;Ehlermann-Cache 2007;Berrios 2006), highlighting how to improve the effectiveness of internal controls and monitoring practices via moral responsiveness and agency (Painter-Morland, 2011;Neu D. et al, 2013). If successful, these practices have the potentials to construct a disciplined and ethical subject whose behaviors make corruptive practices the exception rather than the norm.…”