Accountability in legal decision-making

Abstract

Having to explain a decision has often been found to have a positive effect on the quality of a decision. We aimed to determine whether different accountability requirements for judges (i.e., having to justify their decision or having to explicate their decision) affect evidence use. Those requirements were compared to instructions based on the falsification principle and a control condition. Participants (N ¼ 173) decided on the defendant's guilt in a murder case vignette and explained their decision according to the instructions. The explication and falsification (but not the justification) instructions increased the use of exonerating evidence. There was no significant difference between the groups in guilt perception. The use of exonerating evidence was a significant positive predictor of acquittal rates. The implications for the different forms of instructions in practice are positive, but suggest a difference between the evidence considered and the evidence used to account for the decision.

Psychological assumptions underlying credibility assessments in Finnish asylum determinations

“…The primacy effect and belief perseverance again represent our tendency to give undue weight to our first impressions and adhere to initial beliefs even in light of new evidence against them (Burke, 2006;Kassin et al, 2013). This tendency has also recently been found in asylum decision-making (Maegherman et al, 2018). Importantly, bias affects everyone and is not only due to incompetence (Dror, 2020).…”

“…This is not fully supported by empirical research (Dowd et al, 2018;Granhag et al, 2017;Herlihy & Turner, 2009). Several authors have criticized the criteria of "plausibility" for being based on fundamentally subjective and culture-specific commonsense judgements (Herlihy & Turner, 2009;Maegherman et al, 2018;Sweeney, 2009). Moreover, the criteria of sufficiency of detail and consistency have been criticized for being subjective when applied, despite conceptually seeming objective, as well as being too extensively relied upon (Maegherman et al, 2018;Sweeney, 2009).…”

“…Several authors have criticized the criteria of "plausibility" for being based on fundamentally subjective and culture-specific commonsense judgements (Herlihy & Turner, 2009;Maegherman et al, 2018;Sweeney, 2009). Moreover, the criteria of sufficiency of detail and consistency have been criticized for being subjective when applied, despite conceptually seeming objective, as well as being too extensively relied upon (Maegherman et al, 2018;Sweeney, 2009). The analysis in the UNHCR handbook (2013) agrees that asylum officials sometimes make decisions on premises that are in conflict with current psychological knowledge about for example, memory, cultural differences, and decision-making.…”

“…Previous research has addressed various problematic aspects of credibility assessments in asylum cases (see e.g., Cameron, 2010;Cohen, 2001;Granhag et al, 2005;Kagan, 2003;Maegherman et al, 2018). Nonetheless, only two studies have explicitly analyzed the underlying assumptions held by decision-makers in written determination letters (Dowd et al, 2018;Herlihy et al, 2010).…”

“…The UNHCR highlights that plausibility, although described as a credibility indicator, should be used with considerable caution and never be the sole ground for rejecting asylum (UNHCR, 2013). The UNCHR recommends defining plausibility as the "realistic likelihood of events", commonly interpreted as implying that a statement is implausible if a decision-maker deems it to be "beyond human experience of possible occurrence" (Maegherman et al, 2018). Although the definition is precise, according to whom something is implausible remains a subjective element.…”