Accountability and Inaction: NGOs and Resource Lodging in Development

Abstract

From the late 1980s, research on NGOs had a normative focus and was vulnerable to changing donor preoccupations. This article contributes a new conceptual approach, analysing the practices through which relationships and resources are translated into programmes and projects. The theoretical justification for this move combines the new ethnography of development practice with a re‐agency approach to transactions across time and space. The study is based on data including thirty hours of video ethnography involving interviews and field visits with Kenyan NGOs in a variety of sectors. The analysis focuses on the problem of accountability that emerged through the interactions of donors and state corruption. We argue that NGOs operating in capital cities often provide organizational solutions to this problem. Depending on donor preferences, varying amounts of resources become ‘lodged’ or absorbed in ‘capital NGOs’ as they provide accounts of programmes that satisfy donors. However, no matter the donor preferences, capital NGOs provide accountability independently of increased action with communities or increased resources transferred to them. We conclude that the institutionalization of the NGO field as a well‐grounded specialization depends in part on the degree to which researchers can sideline the stories generated in inter‐organizational contexts such as workshops and policy meetings, and substitute understandings based on accounting practices, resource flows and social ties.

The Determinants of Technical Efficiency of Hazelnut Production in Azerbaijan: An Analysis of the Role of NGOs

“…Farmers disclose that rampant changes in training schedules are prevalent which disturbs farmers in the hazelnut production. Poor organization of NGOs has been cited as a bad element to productivity improvement [30,80]. In our case, this has provoked a perception that NGOs lack seriousness of purpose and are labeled as time wasters.…”

“…Finally, response to NGO intervention is voluntary on the part of the farmer. This makes accountability very complicated because expectations are not well set [30]. Farmers in most cases do not take training seriously but are rather interested in the incentive given after the training.…”

“…Intuitively, this could be an indication of a violation of the essential requirements necessary for improved productivity. As Harsh, et al [30] points out, poor organization or lack of trust from farmers would frustrate any developmental scheme in agriculture. The current situation questions the role of NGOs and also demands an establishment as to whether the existing environment guarantees increased productivity on account of NGO intervention.…”

Exploring Accountability Discourses and Practices in the Spanish Aid System

“…On the other hand, seen from the perspective of rights-based approaches, NGOs contribute to democratic governance, so accountability is about 'balancing the multiple responsibilities to the many actors involved by different means, favouring harmonisation instead of regulation' (Jordan and Van Tuijl, 2006: 12-13). At the field level, NGOs' accountability to those with whom they work generates inherent tensions (Harsh et al, 2010).…”

What Happened to the Internet? Scientific Communities in Three Low-income Areas, 2000-2010

“…This does not imply they are better at using it or more sophisticated-only that relative to what they seek to do online, they are at ease with their capabilities. between the targeted programs of donors and shifting conditions in recipient countries (Harsh et al 2010). For resources that come from afar, it is difficult if not impossible to ensure continuity, particularly when recipients have local priorities-income generation, for example-that are different from donors (Shrum 2005).…”