Accomplice Witnesses and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy

Abstract

We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade-offs involved in the introduction of an accomplice-witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice-witness program. As predicted by the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistent with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency

Organised Crime, Insider Information and Optimal Leniency

“…Acconcia et al . () show that some predictions of the theoretical model developed above appear to be corroborated by the evidence available for Italy. Indeed, consistent with this evidence, our model predicts a positive correlation between the number of crimes (deterrence), the probability of convicting the boss and the introduction of a leniency programme.…”

“…Concerning the optimality of using a leniency programme, Acconcia et al . () show that the Italian leniency programme engendered a noticeable reduction of mafia related crimes. Moreover, they document an increasing trend in prosecution rates of mafia related crimes, a pattern that is not present when looking at prosecution rates of similar but not mafia related crimes for which a leniency programme is not available.…”

“…when s grows larger). 23 The positive correlation between the probability of convicting the boss, the efficiency of the judicial system and the introduction of a leniency programme is, instead, widely documented by Acconcia et al (2014).…”

“…However, the efficiency of these programmes cannot be taken for granted, thereby calling for more empirical research on this ground, see, e.g. Acconcia et al (2014) for a study of the Italian experience.…”

Legalizing Bribe Giving

“…See Miller (2009) for market data regarding cartels, and Apesteguia, Dufwenberg, and Selten (2007), Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008), and Bigoni et al (2012a) for experimental evidence. For recent evidence of success against mafia-related crime, see Acconcia et al (2013). Recalling, the higher is the efficiency of a country's legal institutions, the lower is C, the cost of reporting bribery.…”