Accessing the Moral Law through Feeling

Ware, Owen

doi:10.1017/s1369415415000060

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 3 publications

(1 reference statement)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…If so, does Kant's doctrine of the "fact of reason" entail it? My response to this question goes hand in hand with Ware's (2015) take on the connection between the moral feeling and the "fact of reason". In his response article to Grenberg, Ware (2015, 308-309) argues that it should be possible to include the moral feeling into Kant's justification argument by establishing a positive connection between the moral feeling and the fact of reason, "without making it identical to the fact of reason".…”

Section: Transcendental Nature Of This Interpretation and A Priori St...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Feeling and Moral Motivation in Kant: A Response to the Frierson-Grenberg Debate

Radhakrishnan

2023

Con-textos kantianos

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, I aim to resolve the Frierson-Grenberg debate on the nature of Kant’s account of moral motivation that took place in the third issue of Con-textos Kantianos. In their respective interpretations, Frierson and Grenberg fail to accommodate the a priori status of moral feeling when incorporating it into Kant’s moral motivational structure. In response, I provide a novel transcendental interpretation – one that takes the a priori moral feeling both as an incentive of morality and as that which conditions the possibility of morality in human agents. I argue that Kant developed the notion of moral feeling solely in order to resolve the problem of motivational skepticism concerning the moral law. Since this problem occurs as a part of Kant’s search for the supreme principle of morality, the notion of moral feeling becomes a part of both Kant’s moral motivational structure and his argument to justify the moral law.

show abstract

Section: Transcendental Nature Of This Interpretation and A Priori St...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Feeling and Moral Motivation in Kant: A Response to the Frierson-Grenberg Debate

Radhakrishnan

2023

Con-textos kantianos

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Likewise, I do not gain an awareness of the cup by means of a process of inferential or deductive reasoning (cf. Grenberg, 2013, p. 193; Ware, 2015 p. 302). I cannot choose what is given to me in perception; the cup of coffee on the table is simply given as a fact of my empirical experience.…”

Section: The Gallows Manmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Gallows Alien: Extending the Concept <Person> to Non-Human Organisms

Hamblin-Yule

2022

Dialogue

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Immanuel Kant maintained throughout his life that non-human persons likely exist but he failed to specify how we could recognise them. In this article, I argue (a) that non-human organisms can be considered non-human persons if they can be judged as belonging to a species with a moral vocation, and (b) a species can be judged as having a moral vocation if at least one of its members is able to make what I will call a “moral sacrifice” in which that member sacrifices its physical life for the sake of its moral life.

show abstract

“…Theories range from Aristotle and Plato's ethical virtues (Price, 1989;Polansky, 2014), relations between ethics and metaphysics (Guyer & Wood, 1998;Whittaker, 1916), the apotheosis of the average and the science of proportion (Thomas, 1896;Knapp, 2007) to the stakeholder theory, business ethics (Wijnberg, 2000), marketing ethics (Singhapakdi, Vitell, Rao, & Kurtz, 1999), the ethics of data collection (Mutlu, 2015(Mutlu, : 1000, military ethics (Mileham, 2015), the ethics of terrorists (Dreisbach, 2011), or ‗the ethics of Google Earth' (Sheppard & Cizek, 2009). No agreement has been reached (Ware, 2015) and contemporary dilemmas seek for an answer (Birnbacher & Birnbacher, 2017). Should a machine maximize happiness by terminating the life of an old man to save ten young women?…”

Section: Ethics In Machines? a Need For Consensusmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Long Road Toward Tracking the Trackers and De-biasing: A Consensus on Shaking the Black Box and Freeing From Bias

Bouchagiar¹

2019

RES

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Automated decision making is both promising and threatening. Processing the biggest data possible may lead to societal advances but also violate human rights. There is, then, an acute need to protect individuals without impeding major benefits. Non-human agents may be biased; and they may not lend themselves to easy explanations. Instead of focusing on interpreting models, there seems to be a shift toward a concept of risk assessments. Opaque systems are aimed at predicting, or forecasting, future situations. This challenges human values and ethical principles. Even though incorporating ethics in machines is an old subject of legal discussion, consensus has not yet been reached; for theories and values may be controversial. This paper examines whether there could be an agreement on fundamental principles. A commonly understood basis could allow for fair and proportionate mechanisms to address crucial aspects of partiality and opacity in automated decision making. It could trigger a shift toward a concept of ‘tracking the trackers’ and a discussion on a ‘right to an unbiased decision maker’.

show abstract

Accessing the Moral Law through Feeling

Cited by 5 publications

References 3 publications

Feeling and Moral Motivation in Kant: A Response to the Frierson-Grenberg Debate

Feeling and Moral Motivation in Kant: A Response to the Frierson-Grenberg Debate

The Gallows Alien: Extending the Concept <Person> to Non-Human Organisms

The Long Road Toward Tracking the Trackers and De-biasing: A Consensus on Shaking the Black Box and Freeing From Bias

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About