Access regulation and investment in next generation networks — A ranking of regulatory regimes

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The access price is a function of investment costs and the regulatory regime. A regime with fully distributed costs or a regulatory holiday induces highest investments, followed by risk-sharing and long-run-incremental cost regulation. Risk-sharing creates most consumer welfare, followed by regimes with fully distributed costs, long-run-incremental costs and regulatory holiday, respectively. Risk-sharing benefits consumers as it combines relatively high ex-ante investment incentives with strong ex-post competitive intensity. Terms of use: Documents in

The impact of regulation and competition on the adoption of fiber-based broadband services: recent evidence from the European union member states

“…Finally, pending decisions on NGA regulations have already led to substantial regulatory uncertainty which constitutes another investment impediment. According to Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011), who model the effects of different regulatory regimes on NGA investment, a regime of less intense access regulations or 9…”

The European Electronic Communications Code: A critical appraisal with a focus on incentivizing investment in next generation broadband networks

“…Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) analyse a twostage framework with identical firms, where the incumbent is the only firm entitled with an investment option and investment success in terms of future demand is uncertain. Their work compares the impact of different modes of regulation (cost-based access, co-investment 7 and regulatory holiday) in terms of investment and consumer welfare outcomes, and conclude that co-investment can be particularly beneficial both in terms of investment incentives and consumer welfare.…”

The European Electronic Communications Code: A Critical Appraisal with a Focus on Incentivizing Investment in next Generation Broadband Networks

“…Their work compares the impact of different modes of regulation (cost-based access, co-investment 7 and regulatory holiday) in terms of investment and consumer welfare outcomes, and conclude that co-investment can be particularly beneficial both in terms of investment incentives and consumer welfare. Silvestri (2012, 2013) use a similar model to Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011), but analyse a dynamic framework with vertically differentiated firms looking also to social, and not only consumer, welfare. In particular, Cambini and Silvestri (2013) study two different approaches of co-investment compensation mechanisms: basic investment sharing, where the firms share the investment cost and do not pay each other any compensation for the use of the NGA networks; joint-venture, where the firms share the investment cost and then set an internal access charge for the use of the NGA infrastructure that maximises their joint profits.…”