Access pricing and investment with stochastically growing demand

Hori, Keiichi; Mizuno, Keizo

doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.09.010

Cited by 66 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 13 publications

(17 reference statements)

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“…Several papers deal with incumbent and entrant investment in models that capture a new industry, in which two firms have to decide, which one will invest first and in which access regulation has been established before (Hori and Mizuno, 2006;Vareda and Hoernig, 2007). Here, low access charges usually (but not always) retard both the incumbent's (initial) and the entrant's investments, while high access charges lead to preemptive strategies.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive Regulation, Investments and Technological Change

Vogelsang¹

2012

Regulation and the Performance of Communication and Information Networks

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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confidence: 99%

Incentive Regulation, Investments and Technological Change

Vogelsang¹

2012

Regulation and the Performance of Communication and Information Networks

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“…Jorde, Sidak and Teece (2000) find that the usage of unbundling decreases investment, and Bourreau and Dogan (2005) and Hori and Mizuno (2006) examine regulation-price effects on infrastructure competition. Bourreau and Dogan (2006) also claim that unbundling delays technology adoption.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Natural Monopoly and Distorted Competition: Evidence from Unbundling Fiber-Optic Networks

Minamihashi

2012

SSRN Journal

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“…Other recent work includes Brito, Pereira and Vareda (2012) and Bourreau, Cambini and Dogan (2012), which consider the migration from old to new technology and the role of access rules. Less closely related are studies that investigate the effects of access prices on the outcome of dynamic investment races (e.g., Hori and Mizuno, 2006;Vareda and Hoernig, 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investment under uncertainty and regulation of new access networks

Inderst¹,

Peitz²

2014

Information Economics and Policy

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. Non-technical SummaryContractual and regulatory provisions for access affect incentives to invest in an upgraded network and, in particular, a next-generation access network. Investment decisions are made under uncertainty and have to be made over time. This papers provides a framework for taking uncertainty, risk aversion, and the timing of investment explicitly into account. First, it evaluates various access price policies in a framework in which the incremental value over the legacy network is uncertain. Second, introducing risk aversion, the access price structure turns out to be critical for the risk profile of the investing telecom operator and of the access-seeking alternative operator. Third, some implications of the time structure of access payments are derived. AbstractContractual and regulatory provisions for access affect incentives to invest in an upgraded network and, in particular, a next-generation access network. Investment decisions are made under uncertainty and have to be made over time. This papers provides a framework for taking uncertainty, risk aversion, and the timing of investment explicitly into account. First, it evaluates various access price policies in a framework in which the incremental value over the legacy network is uncertain. Second, introducing risk aversion, the access price structure turns out to be critical for the risk profile of the investing telecom operator and of the access-seeking alternative operator. Third, some implications of the time structure of access payments are derived.

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Access pricing and investment with stochastically growing demand

Cited by 66 publications

References 13 publications

Incentive Regulation, Investments and Technological Change

Incentive Regulation, Investments and Technological Change

Natural Monopoly and Distorted Competition: Evidence from Unbundling Fiber-Optic Networks

Investment under uncertainty and regulation of new access networks

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