Abuse of Power An Experimental Investigation of the Effects of Power and Transparency on Centralized Punishment

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We investigate power abuse of a single punisher in a public-goods-game subject to variations in punishment power and contribution transparency. We find a high amount of abuse across all conditions. More power led to more abuse over time, while transparency could only curb abuse in the high power conditions. These findings highlight the dangers of power centralization, but suggest a more complex relation of power and transparency Terms of use: Documents in

Normative Perception of Power Abuse

“…To study the abusive behavior and the normative perception of power, we conducted a two-part experiment. The first part is very similar to the design used in Hoeft and Mill (2017). In particular, a standard Public Goods game (the PGG) is implemented for 15 rounds with one subject assigned to the additional role of punisher throughout the game.…”

“…In this study we tackle these questions by experimentally investigating abuse of power and its causal relationships with normative perceptions by various parties. We implement a Public Goods game that allows one powerful participant (punisher), who fulfills the role of a sanctioning authority, to dictate contribution norms, while being free to exempt himself from them (Hoeft and Mill, 2017). Unlike the established designs, where all players have the means to punish others (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000), this game models the ambivalence of indirect abuse of power: not contributing while forcing others to do so is unfair, but enforcing high contribution norms is beneficial, even if the punisher does not himself comply.…”