2013
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2197235
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Absenteeism, Unemployment and Employment Protection Legislation: Evidence from Italy

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…For instance, Scoppa and Vuri (2014) find that workers who are absent more frequently face higher risks of dismissal. Thus even in countries with nominally full replacement, in our model, this might translate to a replacement rate smaller than one.…”
Section: Modeling Contagious Presenteeism and Noncontagious Absenteeimentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For instance, Scoppa and Vuri (2014) find that workers who are absent more frequently face higher risks of dismissal. Thus even in countries with nominally full replacement, in our model, this might translate to a replacement rate smaller than one.…”
Section: Modeling Contagious Presenteeism and Noncontagious Absenteeimentioning
confidence: 99%
“…5 More precisely, we assume that at every point in time there exist three fractions of workers: a first share of workers, 1 − q − p t , who are healthy; a second share of workers, q, who are sick due to a noncontagious disease, σ t = σ nt ; and a third share of workers, p t , who are sick due to a contagious 4 Notice that the wage may also include nonmonetary benefits, such as more job security. For instance, Scoppa and Vuri (2014) find that workers who are absent more frequently face higher risks of dismissal. Thus even in countries with nominally full replacement, in our model, this might translate to a replacement rate smaller than one due to future income opportunities and other costs and benefits.…”
Section: Two Types Of Diseases and Negative Externalities Due To Contmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…1 This suggests a positive impact on absence, given the substantial evidence that employment protection fosters absence (Ichino and Riphahn 2005, Olsson 2009, Scoppa and Vuri 2014.…”
Section: The Work Constitution Act and Absence Behaviourmentioning
confidence: 99%