Abstract:Can one both be an Aristotelian in ethics and a negativist, whereby the latter involves subscribing to the view that the good cannot be known in our social context but that ethical guidance is nonetheless possible in virtue of a pluralist conception of the bad (of which this context and human history provide us ample knowledge)? Moreover, is it possible to combine Aristotelianism with a thoroughly historical outlook? I have argued that such combinations are, indeed, possible, and that we can find an example of… Show more
“…This framing, Freyenhagen claims, can also help us make sense of Adorno's own account of the badness of Auschwitz—the evils of which, for him, went clearly “beyond [the] physical agony” of individuals (Freyenhagen, , p. 870) into the destruction of their individuality wholesale. The administrative murder of millions made of death a thing one had never yet to fear in just this fashion… it was no longer an individual who died, but a specimen (Adorno, , p. 362, quoted in part by Freyenhagen, , p. 245, cited by Freyenhagen, , p. 870).This, as Freyenhagen points out, may not represent the fullest possible account of the badness of, for example, Auschwitz. Perhaps indeed giving the fullest possible account might require a comprehensive account of the good.…”
Section: Negative Naturalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, according to Freyenhagen, the naturalism in question here is not solely a prospective one. As he puts this point, … my Adorno's Aristotelianism is both retrospective and prospective – or to be more precise: For him, we can draw on the long history of domination and suffering to build up a pluralist conception of the bad (consulting, if you like, Benjamin's angel of history about the storms of the past that propel him forward); but this retrospective work does not suffice to identify the human good, of which we can only speak prospectively as something yet to be realised and as such not something we can positively identify from where we are now (Freyenhagen, , p. 863).This means that history can play a much bigger part in Freyenhagen's account than O'Connor appears to give him credit for. After all, History teaches us (or can do so, if we are attentive to it) what is bad for us qua human beings.…”
Section: Negative Naturalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…After all, History teaches us (or can do so, if we are attentive to it) what is bad for us qua human beings. And about our potential for the human good, we also only know from the careful study of history and contemporary society, not from a metaphysics that swings free from history and sociology (Freyenhagen, ).Second, this story about the bad is not—according to Freyenhagen—a “one‐dimensional” one, rooted solely in brute physical pain. In the book, Freyenhagen now clarifies, he often emphasises the badness of physical pain—but here he states that this is just for the sake of providing “stark, relatively simple examples” (Freyenhagen, , p. 869).…”
Section: Negative Naturalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It probably makes best sense to think of values along a tripartite distinction rather than a simple dualism of good and bad. In Adorno's Practical Philosophy , I suggest such a tripartite distinction between (a) the bads, (b) the overcoming of the bads in basic … human functioning, and (c) the good (Freyenhagen, ).This, according to Freyenhagen, allows him to make sense of the badness of torture without abandoning strict negativism—because we can now see that its badness consists not in the way that it robs us from things we value as good , but rather insofar as it robs us of capacities required for basic human functioning. This framing, Freyenhagen claims, can also help us make sense of Adorno's own account of the badness of Auschwitz—the evils of which, for him, went clearly “beyond [the] physical agony” of individuals (Freyenhagen, , p. 870) into the destruction of their individuality wholesale.…”
Section: Negative Naturalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In Adorno's Practical Philosophy , I suggest such a tripartite distinction between (a) the bads, (b) the overcoming of the bads in basic … human functioning, and (c) the good (Freyenhagen, ).This, according to Freyenhagen, allows him to make sense of the badness of torture without abandoning strict negativism—because we can now see that its badness consists not in the way that it robs us from things we value as good , but rather insofar as it robs us of capacities required for basic human functioning. This framing, Freyenhagen claims, can also help us make sense of Adorno's own account of the badness of Auschwitz—the evils of which, for him, went clearly “beyond [the] physical agony” of individuals (Freyenhagen, , p. 870) into the destruction of their individuality wholesale. The administrative murder of millions made of death a thing one had never yet to fear in just this fashion… it was no longer an individual who died, but a specimen (Adorno, , p. 362, quoted in part by Freyenhagen, , p. 245, cited by Freyenhagen, , p. 870).This, as Freyenhagen points out, may not represent the fullest possible account of the badness of, for example, Auschwitz.…”
Recent Adorno scholarship has been shaped by the idea that his critical theory cannot account coherently for its own method. Call this the Problem of Adornian Critical Theory (PACT). In this paper, I examine three recent approaches to Adorno—the “ethics of resistance” (associated with Gordon Finlayson and Brian O'Connor), “negative naturalism” (associated with Fabian Freyenhagen), and “inverse theology” (associated with Peter E. Gordon). Individually, I argue, all three approaches are subject to a key limitation that prevents them from being able to solve the PACT. But, by synthesising them, we can see how the scholarship already—effectively—possesses a solution to it. The synthesis that results is characterised in terms of “materialist metaphysics”—a position Adorno can clearly be read as articulating in the “Meditations on Metaphysics” chapter of Negative Dialectics.
“…This framing, Freyenhagen claims, can also help us make sense of Adorno's own account of the badness of Auschwitz—the evils of which, for him, went clearly “beyond [the] physical agony” of individuals (Freyenhagen, , p. 870) into the destruction of their individuality wholesale. The administrative murder of millions made of death a thing one had never yet to fear in just this fashion… it was no longer an individual who died, but a specimen (Adorno, , p. 362, quoted in part by Freyenhagen, , p. 245, cited by Freyenhagen, , p. 870).This, as Freyenhagen points out, may not represent the fullest possible account of the badness of, for example, Auschwitz. Perhaps indeed giving the fullest possible account might require a comprehensive account of the good.…”
Section: Negative Naturalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First, according to Freyenhagen, the naturalism in question here is not solely a prospective one. As he puts this point, … my Adorno's Aristotelianism is both retrospective and prospective – or to be more precise: For him, we can draw on the long history of domination and suffering to build up a pluralist conception of the bad (consulting, if you like, Benjamin's angel of history about the storms of the past that propel him forward); but this retrospective work does not suffice to identify the human good, of which we can only speak prospectively as something yet to be realised and as such not something we can positively identify from where we are now (Freyenhagen, , p. 863).This means that history can play a much bigger part in Freyenhagen's account than O'Connor appears to give him credit for. After all, History teaches us (or can do so, if we are attentive to it) what is bad for us qua human beings.…”
Section: Negative Naturalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…After all, History teaches us (or can do so, if we are attentive to it) what is bad for us qua human beings. And about our potential for the human good, we also only know from the careful study of history and contemporary society, not from a metaphysics that swings free from history and sociology (Freyenhagen, ).Second, this story about the bad is not—according to Freyenhagen—a “one‐dimensional” one, rooted solely in brute physical pain. In the book, Freyenhagen now clarifies, he often emphasises the badness of physical pain—but here he states that this is just for the sake of providing “stark, relatively simple examples” (Freyenhagen, , p. 869).…”
Section: Negative Naturalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It probably makes best sense to think of values along a tripartite distinction rather than a simple dualism of good and bad. In Adorno's Practical Philosophy , I suggest such a tripartite distinction between (a) the bads, (b) the overcoming of the bads in basic … human functioning, and (c) the good (Freyenhagen, ).This, according to Freyenhagen, allows him to make sense of the badness of torture without abandoning strict negativism—because we can now see that its badness consists not in the way that it robs us from things we value as good , but rather insofar as it robs us of capacities required for basic human functioning. This framing, Freyenhagen claims, can also help us make sense of Adorno's own account of the badness of Auschwitz—the evils of which, for him, went clearly “beyond [the] physical agony” of individuals (Freyenhagen, , p. 870) into the destruction of their individuality wholesale.…”
Section: Negative Naturalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In Adorno's Practical Philosophy , I suggest such a tripartite distinction between (a) the bads, (b) the overcoming of the bads in basic … human functioning, and (c) the good (Freyenhagen, ).This, according to Freyenhagen, allows him to make sense of the badness of torture without abandoning strict negativism—because we can now see that its badness consists not in the way that it robs us from things we value as good , but rather insofar as it robs us of capacities required for basic human functioning. This framing, Freyenhagen claims, can also help us make sense of Adorno's own account of the badness of Auschwitz—the evils of which, for him, went clearly “beyond [the] physical agony” of individuals (Freyenhagen, , p. 870) into the destruction of their individuality wholesale. The administrative murder of millions made of death a thing one had never yet to fear in just this fashion… it was no longer an individual who died, but a specimen (Adorno, , p. 362, quoted in part by Freyenhagen, , p. 245, cited by Freyenhagen, , p. 870).This, as Freyenhagen points out, may not represent the fullest possible account of the badness of, for example, Auschwitz.…”
Recent Adorno scholarship has been shaped by the idea that his critical theory cannot account coherently for its own method. Call this the Problem of Adornian Critical Theory (PACT). In this paper, I examine three recent approaches to Adorno—the “ethics of resistance” (associated with Gordon Finlayson and Brian O'Connor), “negative naturalism” (associated with Fabian Freyenhagen), and “inverse theology” (associated with Peter E. Gordon). Individually, I argue, all three approaches are subject to a key limitation that prevents them from being able to solve the PACT. But, by synthesising them, we can see how the scholarship already—effectively—possesses a solution to it. The synthesis that results is characterised in terms of “materialist metaphysics”—a position Adorno can clearly be read as articulating in the “Meditations on Metaphysics” chapter of Negative Dialectics.
I argue that Theodor W. Adorno’s philosophy articulates a radical conception of hope. According to Lear, radical hope is ‘directed toward a future goodness that transcends the current ability to understand what it is’. Given Adorno’s claim that the current world is radically evil, and that we cannot know or even imagine what the good is, it is plausible that his conception of hope must be radical in this sense. I develop this argument through an analysis of (a) Adorno’s engagement with Kant’s conception of hope, (b) Adorno’s references to hope and (c) his critical diagnosis of a metaphysical need for hope. Having demonstrated that Adorno must reject both ordinary and Kantian hope, I examine why Adorno thinks that we still may have reasons for hope. I also show that Adorno’s conception of hope differs from Lear’s in one important respect.
Der neo-aristotelischen Tugendethik zufolge hängen ethische Maßstäbe von der biologischen Spezieszugehörigkeit der ethischen Akteure ab. Diese Perspektive, so argumentiert Richard Friedrich Runge in seinem Buch, bleibt bislang unbefriedigend. Unter Einbeziehung der modernen philosophischen Biologie und der dialektischen Anthropologie von Erich Fromm plädiert der Autor für eine kritische Wendung der Tugendethik und ein dialektisches Verständnis der Beziehung von Individuum und Umwelt. Seine kritische Theorie der Tugendethik ist der Versuch eines großen systematischen Neuentwurfs in einer der bestimmenden metaethischen Debatten unserer Zeit. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
