A Virtue for Courageous Minds

Abstract

Political moderation is the touchstone of democracy, which could not function without compromise and bargaining, yet it is one of the most understudied concepts in political theory. How can we explain this striking paradox? Why do we often underestimate the virtue of moderation? Seeking to answer these questions, this book examines moderation in modern French political thought and sheds light on the French Revolution and its legacy. The book begins with classical thinkers who extolled the virtues of a moderate approach to politics, such as Aristotle and Cicero. It then shows how Montesquieu inaugurated the modern rebirth of this tradition by laying the intellectual foundations for moderate government. The book looks at important figures such as Jacques Necker, Germaine de Staël, and Benjamin Constant, not only in the context of revolutionary France but throughout Europe. It traces how moderation evolves from an individual moral virtue into a set of institutional arrangements calculated to protect individual liberty, and explores the deep affinity between political moderation and constitutional complexity. The book demonstrates how moderation navigates between political extremes, and it challenges the common notion that moderation is an essentially conservative virtue, stressing instead its eclectic nature. Drawing on a broad range of writings in political theory, the history of political thought, philosophy, and law, the book reveals how the virtue of political moderation can address the profound complexities of the world today.

Introduction: The Politics of Moderation

“…A later variant of this line of thought was presented by Benjamin Constant, who argued in favor of the monarchy as a neutral power, rising above the parties, and due to its independence able to adjudicate between contending parties. 40 The justification of such neutral instance was strictly functional-any independent instance would do-and fitted seamlessly in an argument in favor of a strengthened executive power. As Lok demonstrates with reference to Pasquier and the German statesman and historian Leopold von Ranke, and as René Koekkoek emphasize in his analysis of the Atlantic debate on the dangers of clubs and popular societies, a centralized and unitary government came to be seen as the best means to secure a moderate form of politics.…”

“…Craiutu demonstrates this with the example of Halifax's discussion of the statesman as a 'trimmer', indicating not only a man who was versed in the art of compromise between opposing tendencies and able to disarm fanatics and bigots, but also as someone who stood aloof from a moral point of view, and was even to be considered a traitor. 19 The argument for moderation as a virtue also found its limits in Montaigne's precept to be moderate in moderation, but more importantly in Machiavelli's warning that princes should be willing to take radical, even violent measures to curb the ambitions of powerful contenders for power, even if that violence should be 'crudeltà bene usate', a measured form of violence. 20 Even more critical was François de la Rochefoucauld, who claimed that 'moderation is made a virtue to limit the ambition of the great; to console ordinary people for their small fortune and equally small ability'.…”

“…'Radical' or 'extremist' and 'moderate', and their equivalents in different periods and languages, are of course not neutral descriptions, but rhetoric devices that can be used in a variety of ways, depending on the circumstances, as a result of which modesty was seen as a virtue, yet 'moderantism' as a vice. 46 One important aspect to address will therefore be the relation between moderation and power. Most importantly, moderation is seen as a virtue or an idea, or as an effect of institutional or social circumstances, which is able to restrain, limit, or suppress radical, extreme, or violent political passions.…”