2021
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-021-04068-2
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A violent market price contract for agribusiness supply chain

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Cited by 5 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…This paper considers that the brand owner is the leader of the platform supply chain and the e-commerce platform is its follower (e.g., Apple and JD.com mentioned above). To obtain equilibriums of the Stackelberg game, the Backward Induction Method is adopted [37][38][39].…”
Section: Model Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This paper considers that the brand owner is the leader of the platform supply chain and the e-commerce platform is its follower (e.g., Apple and JD.com mentioned above). To obtain equilibriums of the Stackelberg game, the Backward Induction Method is adopted [37][38][39].…”
Section: Model Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…finalizing the contract menu, the manufacturer can limit the option to relatively simple menus, depending on the farmer pool's heterogeneity. Rajput and Venkataraman (2022) develop a Stackelberg game between a firm and a farmer and propose a pricing mechanism that adjusts the market price to accommodate extreme price fluctuations that can enable both parties to avoid violation of the contract. Ayvaz-Çavdaroglu et al (2021) analyze policies for a for-profit cooperative that offers quality-based payments to risk-averse farmers who operate under yield uncertainty, quality requirements, and open market prices.…”
Section: Production and Operations Managementmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They find that when finalizing the contract menu, the manufacturer can limit the option to relatively simple menus, depending on the farmer pool's heterogeneity. Rajput and Venkataraman (2022) develop a Stackelberg game between a firm and a farmer and propose a pricing mechanism that adjusts the market price to accommodate extreme price fluctuations that can enable both parties to avoid violation of the contract. Ayvaz‐Çavdaroğlu et al.…”
Section: Stakeholder Engagement For Farming In a Digital Eramentioning
confidence: 99%