A Vindication of Strong Aesthetic Supervenience

Fudge, Robert

doi:10.1080/05568640509485153

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(I) Epistemic Aesthetic Moral and Normative Supervenience1

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2018

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“…13 See e.g. Levinson (1984), Bender (1987), Zangwill (1992Zangwill ( , 1994Zangwill ( , 2003, Fudge (2005), Hick (2012).…”

Section: (I) Epistemic Aesthetic Moral and Normative Superveniencementioning

confidence: 99%

Why Believe in Normative Supervenience?

Roberts¹

2018

Oxford Scholarship Online

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According to many, that the normative supervenes on the non-normative is a truism of normative discourse. This chapter argues that those committed to more specific moral, aesthetic, and epistemic supervenience theses should also hold (NS*): As a matter of conceptual necessity, whenever something has a normative property, it has a base property or collection of base properties that metaphysically necessitates the normative one. The main aim in this chapter is to show that none of the available arguments establish (NS*), or indeed the relevant epistemic, aesthetic, and moral supervenience theses. (NS*) is not a conceptual truth. This has considerable dialectical importance. One interesting upshot is that it affords non-reductivists and non-naturalists a novel way of resisting certain prominent supervenience-based objections to their views, including objections that formulate supervenience as a purely metaphysical thesis.

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“…13 See e.g. Levinson (1984), Bender (1987), Zangwill (1992Zangwill ( , 1994Zangwill ( , 2003, Fudge (2005), Hick (2012).…”

Section: (I) Epistemic Aesthetic Moral and Normative Superveniencementioning

confidence: 99%