A very short introduction

Vincent, Nicholas

doi:10.1093/actrade/9780199582877.003.0001

Cited by 5 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…In the fall of 1214 the complaints of the barons came to a head and they confronted John, demanding that he grant them rights dating back to the coronation charter of Henry I and the promises of Edward the Confessor before him (Vincent , 11). They particularly objected to the scutage (payments in lieu of military service) he demanded to support a return to France to reclaim his empire.…”

Section: Historical Context Of Magna Cartamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The 1216 version dropped twenty‐three clauses, leaving thirty‐seven intact (Howard, 1964, 24; Vincent , 86), and notably, the enforcement clause was one of those deleted (Carpenter , 409). The charter was reissued again in November 1217, with minor changes and was approved by the pope (Vincent , 84). At the same time, the Charter of the Forest was issued, allowing access to the huge forests that had been claimed by the king.…”

Section: Short‐term Effects Of Magna Carta: Reissues Of 1216 1217 Amentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The 1225 version is the definitive version, which was confirmed by English monarchs more than forty times over the next 200 years, and it was confirmed by great councils or parliaments more than fifty times by 1422 (Hogue , 52; Vincent , 88). In 1354, a statute cited “due process of law” for the first time, and the phrase “no free man” was broadened to “no man of whatever estate or condition he may be” (Holt , 10).…”

Section: Short‐term Effects Of Magna Carta: Reissues Of 1216 1217 Amentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The 1225 version contained the language of the few clauses that remain as part of the statutes of England (Hogue , 52). Most of the chapters were repealed at various times over the centuries, and of the 1215 version, there remain only chapters 1 (ensuring freedom of the English Church), 13 (guaranteeing the city of London “all its ancient liberties and free customs”), 39 (establishing due process and rule of law), and 40 (no selling of justice) (Vincent , 102).…”

Section: Short‐term Effects Of Magna Carta: Reissues Of 1216 1217 Amentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Coke also helped draft the Virginia Charter of 1606 that promised to the colonists “all Liberties, Franchises, and Immunities” of Englishmen … as if they had been abiding and born within this our realm of England” (Vincent , 93). The denial of the rights of Englishmen , which stemmed from Magna Carta and English Bill of Rights, became one of the major provocations that induced the American colonists to declare independence in 1776.…”

Section: Longer‐term Effects Of Magna Cartamentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Contemporary Presidency: Magna Carta and the Contemporary Presidency

Pfiffner

2016

Pres Stud Q

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Despite arguments by some scholars that Magna Carta has been inaccurately mythologized, this article argues that it continues to be relevant to contemporary governance. After an overview of the historical circumstances of the Great Charter, and a discussion of its major clauses, this article examines expansions of individual rights and limits on government in Anglo‐American jurisprudence that trace their origins to Magna Carta. It argues that the timeless principles embedded in Magna Carta continue to be relevant to contemporary governments, particularly the U.S. presidency. It concludes that Magna Carta continues to be important as a classic statement of rule of law, limited government, and individual rights and a potent symbol and argument for restraining government in general and executives in particular.

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Section: Historical Context Of Magna Cartamentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Short‐term Effects Of Magna Carta: Reissues Of 1216 1217 Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Short‐term Effects Of Magna Carta: Reissues Of 1216 1217 Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Short‐term Effects Of Magna Carta: Reissues Of 1216 1217 Amentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Longer‐term Effects Of Magna Cartamentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Contemporary Presidency: Magna Carta and the Contemporary Presidency

Pfiffner

2016

Pres Stud Q

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The Birth of Representative Institutions: The Case of the Crown of Aragon

Møller¹

2017

Soc. sci. hist.

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A new research agenda within political science and economics has been devoted to elucidating the development of medieval representative institutions. However, if we wish to get a clearer grasp of the birth of representative institutions, much more detailed data are needed. This paper introduces and interrogates a new data set on assemblies in one of the first instances where representative institutions arose: the Crown of Aragon. An analysis of these new data, which cover the period 1100–1327, supports several important conclusions. First, the development of representative institutions took place in a couple of brief “bursts” of activity. Second, factors pertaining to the establishment of public order (land peace and the regulation of succession) feature as more important than “geopolitical” factors (war and taxation) in the early part of the period, but the latter factors become more important after assemblies turn representative; indeed, they turn out to be crucial for understanding how assemblies eventually came to constrain rulers. A comparison with the only other early case of representative institutions on which there are good data, thirteenth- and early-fourteenth-century England, supports a third finding: There is a striking, temporal parallelism in the development of representative institutions across the two realms.

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Succession, power‐sharing and the development of representative institutions in medieval Europe

Kokkonen

Møller

2020

European J Political Res

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Historians have documented that in medieval Europe, bargaining over the loyalty of lay magnates and high clergy was most intense during successions and that this often forced monarchs to give political concessions. We argue that matters related to succession predict short-term power-sharing concessions by rulers but that-because they do not permanently alter the balance of power between ruler and elite-they only trigger lasting changes of political institutions if these changes are in the mutual interest of the ruler and the elite groups. It follows that successions are unlikely to have long-term effects on representative institutions but that they may consolidate the rules regulating succession (the succession order). Using the natural deaths of monarchs as an instrument for successions, we confirm these claims with a new dataset that includes fine-grained data on succession and parliament-like assemblies in 16 European polities between 1000 and 1600. These findings shed new light on the development of representative institutions in medieval Europe, on the changes in succession orders that brought about clear rules about primogeniture and on the political leeway of legislatures in authoritarian regimes more generally.

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A very short introduction

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

The Contemporary Presidency: Magna Carta and the Contemporary Presidency

The Contemporary Presidency: Magna Carta and the Contemporary Presidency

The Birth of Representative Institutions: The Case of the Crown of Aragon

Succession, power‐sharing and the development of representative institutions in medieval Europe

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