2018
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-03638-6_27
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A Uniform Information-Flow Security Benchmark Suite for Source Code and Bytecode

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Cited by 8 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 27 publications
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“…We define three different instances of this domain (deep, shal, dumb), each with a different set of relations (Section 3), and show that deep constitutes a secure heap abstraction (Section 4); -We symbolically specify the security semantics of our input language to capture explicit and implicit flows via the heap, and infer polymorphic informationflow guards via a co-reachability analysis (Section 5). We prove that our analysis under a secure heap abstraction guarantees termination-insensitive noninterference [3]; -We empirically study the respective impacts of our three heap domains, in terms of precision on IFSpec benchmarks [25], and in terms of scalability with 60 real-life ABM applications [26] (Section 7). Our experiments show that our approach offers the best precision, and the heap model precision has an inverse relationship with scalability.…”
Section: Summary Of Contributionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…We define three different instances of this domain (deep, shal, dumb), each with a different set of relations (Section 3), and show that deep constitutes a secure heap abstraction (Section 4); -We symbolically specify the security semantics of our input language to capture explicit and implicit flows via the heap, and infer polymorphic informationflow guards via a co-reachability analysis (Section 5). We prove that our analysis under a secure heap abstraction guarantees termination-insensitive noninterference [3]; -We empirically study the respective impacts of our three heap domains, in terms of precision on IFSpec benchmarks [25], and in terms of scalability with 60 real-life ABM applications [26] (Section 7). Our experiments show that our approach offers the best precision, and the heap model precision has an inverse relationship with scalability.…”
Section: Summary Of Contributionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We have employed the IFSpec benchmark suite [25] to assess the precision of our different heap domains and compare our results to KeY [33], Cassandra [21], and Joana [17]. The precision refers to a proportion of test cases that are correctly classified.…”
Section: Precision and Recallmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An evaluation [21] done on a collection of benchmarks [16] containing both secure and insecure programs shows that relational bounded feasible path-coverage is an appropriate coverage criterion for noninterference properties: for high coverage values, we either find no violations for the secure programs or find at least one violation for most insecure programs.…”
Section: Coverage Criteriamentioning
confidence: 99%