The Palgrave Handbook of the Public Servant 2020
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-03008-7_71-1
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A Typology of the Latin American Civil Servant: Patronage Appointee, Technocrat, Loyalist, or Careerist

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Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…The LA region instead is known by its tradition of patrimonial appointments, personal loyalties, and its generalized use of public resources as “politicians” private property (Dussauge Laguna, 2011). This has been confirmed by various studies showing that LA politicians opt for patrimonial strategies and short‐term calculations as means of exerting control over their countries' bureaucracies, ultimately ensuring their own political survival (Flom, 2020; Salazar‐Morales & Lauriano, 2020). Notably, politicians in LA have fewer incentives to build strong meritocratic and autonomic bureaucracies.…”
Section: Scholarship Linking Politicians To Policy Successmentioning
confidence: 75%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The LA region instead is known by its tradition of patrimonial appointments, personal loyalties, and its generalized use of public resources as “politicians” private property (Dussauge Laguna, 2011). This has been confirmed by various studies showing that LA politicians opt for patrimonial strategies and short‐term calculations as means of exerting control over their countries' bureaucracies, ultimately ensuring their own political survival (Flom, 2020; Salazar‐Morales & Lauriano, 2020). Notably, politicians in LA have fewer incentives to build strong meritocratic and autonomic bureaucracies.…”
Section: Scholarship Linking Politicians To Policy Successmentioning
confidence: 75%
“…Ultimately, said situation has provoked innovative attempts to bring together political roles and bureaucratic expertise leading the emergence of various types of hybrids (technocrats, technopoles, or tecnicos ) who resort to their “expert knowledge” in running government as their principal asset for their political activity (Dargent, 2015; Lundin & Öberg, 2014). But also, in other cases, politicians have built a network of support of “saleable” technocrats akin to their ideological orientations, so they can showcase “readiness for office” (Salazar‐Morales & Lauriano, 2020).…”
Section: Scholarship Linking Politicians To Policy Successmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This can happen if presidents must choose which parts of the bureaucracy to use as a "spoils system" to reward partisans and build political support in Congress, and which must be meritocratically insulated to deliver key public goods (Geddes 1990). Typically, finance ministries and other economic institutions have been insulated from extensive patronage because they are perceived to be "strategic" (Ramos and Milanesi 2017;Salazar-Morales and Lauriano 2020). This segmentation can generate some "islands of excellence" or "pockets of effectiveness," even in countries with extensive patronage (McDonnell and Vilaça 2021).…”
Section: Meritocratic Bureaucracies and Their Characteristicsmentioning
confidence: 99%