A Two-Tiered Cognitive Architecture For Moral Reasoning

Bolender, John

doi:10.1023/a:1010663018267

Cited by 11 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…In contrast to implicit learning approaches, some accounts propose innate and sometimes invariant moral intuition capacities in “nativist” fashion (Bolender, 2003)—such as innate cognitive (or cognitive/affective) responses to stimuli, or innate capacities to master the application of moral concepts (akin to language mastery; cf. Bloom, 2000; Bolender, 2001, 2003). Haidt and various colleagues argue for the presence of moral modules attuned toward particular aspects of social life, with these modules having been developed by evolutionary processes (for a summary of this evolutionary framework, see Haidt, 2012, pt.…”

Section: The Process Of Moral Intuitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Intuition

Weaver

Reynolds

Brown

2013

Journal of Management

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In contrast to older, conventional accounts that treat ethical decision making and behavior as the result of deliberative and intendedly rational processes, a rapidly growing body of social science research has framed ethical thought and behavior as driven by intuition. We review this important new body of knowledge in terms of both the process and content of moral intuition. Then, to demonstrate its value to organizational scholars, we consider the potential impact of moral intuition research in four areas of organizational studies especially suited to insights from this research: leadership, organizational corruption, ethics training and education, and divestiture socialization. Our review and discussion suggest that the literature on moral intuition is incredibly rich, fruitful, and meaningful to a wide range of audiences.

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Section: The Process Of Moral Intuitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Intuition

Weaver

Reynolds

Brown

2013

Journal of Management

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“…Mac Intyre noted that on occasion we do have to work-out by logical inference what someone else might be thinking or feeling, but he acknowledged also that we rely on "a primary and more fundamental interpretative knowledge of the thoughts and feelings of others which does not have and does not need inferential justification" (Mac Intyre, 1999a: 14). From a 'modularity of mind' standpoint Bolender (2001) argued that mentally computing the relevant variables would, without the encapsulation of the necessary cognitive and affective functions into intuitive modules, be a potentially enormous computational task involving unrestricted memory search (i.e., imposing an impossible cognitive load on information processing). The moral sense affords the individual an autonomous and quick (i.e., intuitive) knowledge of what is just and fair, but moral knowledge has both conscious analytical-reflective ("conscious mental activity that consists of transforming information about people in order to reach a moral judgment") as well as a non-conscious intuitive-reflexive ("the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment .…”

Section: The Modularity Of Moralitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Before Virtue: Biology, Brain, Behavior, and the “Moral Sense”

Sadler‐Smith

2012

Bus. Ethics Q.

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Biological, brain, and behavioral sciences offer strong and growing support for the virtue ethics account of moral judgment and ethical behavior in business organizations. The acquisition of moral agency in business involves the recognition, refinement, and habituation through the processes of reflexion and reflection of a moral sense encapsulated in innate modules for compassion, hierarchy, reciprocity, purity, and affiliation adaptive for communal life both in ancestral and modern environments. The genetic and neural bases of morality exist independently of institutional frameworks and social structures. The latter not only shape moral behaviors within circumscribed limits, they also imply a plurality and compartmentalization of roles which may enable or impede the habituation of virtue. Becoming a virtuous agent entails the practical refinement of predispositions in situ as a member of a community of practitioners rather than entailing a normative ethical educational project seeking an intellectual resolution of abstract moral questions.

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“…In fact, Norman's kind of dual control model has an application to such diverse areas as attention (Rafal & Henik 1994), reasoning (Epstein 1994;Sloman 1996), attitudes (Wilson et al 2000), moral judgments (Bolender 2001), and emotion (LeDoux 1995), and is revealed in the acquisition of fears and phobias (Jacobs & Nadel 1985) and stress (Toates 1995). This suggests a strong and broad selection pressure to favour dual control.…”

Section: Two Visual Systems Must Still Perceive Eventsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two visual systems and two theories of perception: An attempt to reconcile the constructivist and ecological approaches

Norman¹

2002

Behav Brain Sci

340

214

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The two contrasting theoretical approaches to visual perception, the constructivist and the ecological, are briefly presented and illustrated through their analyses of space and size perception. Earlier calls for their reconciliation and unification are reviewed. Neurophysiological, neuropsychological, and psychophysical evidence for the existence of two quite distinct visual systems, the ventral and the dorsal, is presented. These two perceptual systems differ in their functions; the ventral system's central function is that of identification, while the dorsal system is mainly engaged in the visual control of motor behavior. The strong parallels between the ecological approach and the functioning of the dorsal system, and between the constructivist approach and the functioning of the ventral system are noted. It is also shown that the experimental paradigms used by the proponents of these two approaches match the functions of the respective visual systems. A dual-process approach to visual perception emerges from this analysis, with the ecological-dorsal process transpiring mainly without conscious awareness, while the constructivist-ventral process is normally conscious. Some implications of this dual-process approach to visual-perceptual phenomena are presented, with emphasis on space perception.

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A Two-Tiered Cognitive Architecture For Moral Reasoning

Cited by 11 publications

References 9 publications

Moral Intuition

Moral Intuition

Before Virtue: Biology, Brain, Behavior, and the “Moral Sense”

Two visual systems and two theories of perception: An attempt to reconcile the constructivist and ecological approaches

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