A Two-Sided Incentive Program for Coordinating the Influenza Vaccine Supply Chain

Arifoğlu, Kenan; Tang, Christopher S.

doi:10.1287/msom.2020.0938

Cited by 42 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Extending coordination to affect both the supply and demand sides, Adida et al (2013) proposed a two-side subsidy mechanism depending on the vaccination coverage to achieve the socially optimal coverage. Arifoglu and Tang (2021) studied the vaccine supply chain as a sequential game. They developed a two-sided incentive programme to eliminate the inefficiencies on both the supply and demand sides.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Information sharing and coordination in a vaccine supply chain

Pan

Dong

et al. 2022

Ann Oper Res

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Vaccination is a well-known method to protect the public against an epidemic outbreak, e.g., COVID-19. To this end, the government of a country or region would strive to achieve its target of vaccination coverage. Limited by the total vaccine capacity of public hospitals, the government may need to cooperate with private hospitals or clinics for more vaccination. Exploring in this paper government coordination of public and private resources for vaccination, we model a vaccine system consisting of a public hospital, a profit-maximizing private clinic, and self-interested individuals, under three scenarios: (1) without information sharing (concerning vaccine inventory and vaccine price), (2) with information sharing and subsidy, and (3) with information sharing and allocation. We find that, under scenario (1), the vaccine demand is fully satisfied by the public hospital and the private clinic cannot make any profit. Under scenario (2), the private clinic is willing to enter the vaccine market with a positive profit-maximizing vaccination coverage. Under scenario (3), the socially optimal vaccination coverage may be lower than that under scenario (1). Moreover, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to generate practical implications of the research findings for vaccination policy-making. Our results provide both theoretical and managerial insights on vaccine supply decision, government intervention, and vaccination coverage.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…and cumulative probability function G(.). Similar to Arifoglu and Tang (2021), we consider δ follows an uniform distribution in [0, δ]. We assume that the vaccine is perfectly effective, i.e., all the vaccinated individuals are immunized against the infection (Brito et al 1991;Arifoglu et al 2012).…”

Section: Modellingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information sharing and coordination in a vaccine supply chain

Pan

Dong

et al. 2022

Ann Oper Res

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“…This paper considers that the brand owner is the leader of the platform supply chain and the e-commerce platform is its follower (e.g., Apple and JD.com mentioned above). To obtain equilibriums of the Stackelberg game, the Backward Induction Method is adopted [37][38][39].…”

Section: Model Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

New Practice of E-Commerce Platform: Evidence from Two Trade-In Programs

Lou

et al. 2022

JTAER

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In the context of developing the digital platform economy, trade-in programs have become an effective strategy for e-commerce platforms to stimulate consumption. Many head e-commerce platforms have launched their own trade-in programs. However, the existing research on trade-in programs is still stuck in the traditional trade-in model. The purpose of this study is to explore whether there is a new and more beneficial trade-in program. In this paper, we construct the Stackelberg game model between a brand owner and a B2C e-commerce platform under two trade-in programs and use optimization theory to obtain the equilibrium results of the model. The results indicate that the performance improvement of the new-generation product will promote the increase in two-generation products’ price under traditional trade-in programs, the price of the new-generation product will increase, and the price of the previous-generation product will decrease under new trade-in programs. The brand owner always prefers traditional trade-in to new trade-in. However, the e-commerce platform prefers traditional trade-in to new trade-in just when the previous-generation product is durable enough and the performance improvement of a new-generation product is small enough; otherwise, it prefers new trade-in to traditional trade-in. These findings are beneficial to the operational practices of e-commerce platforms and brand owners.

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“… Arifoğlu and Tang (2021) proposed an incentive program to coordinate a pandemic vaccine supply chain for both sides of demand and supply. On the demand side, there exist individuals who behave on a self-interested basis to participate in vaccination programs.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%