2016 International Conference on Performance Evaluation and Modeling in Wired and Wireless Networks (PEMWN) 2016
DOI: 10.1109/pemwn.2016.7842903
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A trust game model for the cognitive radio networks

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Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…In cognitive radio networks, Bennaceur et al proposed another trust game model to take into consideration the penalty of the malicious users. By introducing the trust game model of cooperative sensing spectrum, the secondary users are encouraged to choose the honest strategy by sending correct sensing outcomes [48].…”
Section: Usermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In cognitive radio networks, Bennaceur et al proposed another trust game model to take into consideration the penalty of the malicious users. By introducing the trust game model of cooperative sensing spectrum, the secondary users are encouraged to choose the honest strategy by sending correct sensing outcomes [48].…”
Section: Usermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…No profiteering technique is employed and selfish nodes cannot be identified. A trust-based on a noncooperative game is given by Bennaeur et al [2], wherein the penalty associated with the faulty SUs is addressed by exempting the MUs from participating in the sensing process for a particular period of time. However, penalisation of genuine SUs who report falsely owing to channel conditions would face considerable expenses.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The alteration of the sensing report by malicious users (MU) is the spectrum data falsification attack (SSDF) that typically occurs at the data link layer. The SSDF attack can be classified into five classes [2]: (a) always yes: in the absence or presence of the PU, the malicious user always reports the presence of a PU to divest the genuine SU;(b) always no: to induce interference, the malicious user always reports the absence of the PU even in its presence; (c) alternator: the malicious user always conflicts the genuine SUs detection output; (d) selfish: at times, the malicious attacker does not participate in the sensing process to save energy; and (e) contingent: report data falsely in a random manner. They play smartly such that identification becomes difficult.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%