A Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Transportation Carbon Emission Reduction across Regions under Government Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Liu, Yunlong; Chen, Leiyu; Huang, Chengfeng

doi:10.3390/su141710562

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 38 publications

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“…An example includes quantifying provincial carbon emission reduction shares through production and consumption [26]. In addition, the regional externalities of transportation emissions can be quantified to promote cross-regional emission reductions in provinces with a transportation carbon deficit and in provinces with a transportation carbon surplus [27]. Owing to uneven carbon emissions across provinces, green transfer payment projects can be used to build green projects and achieve energy conservation and emission reduction [28].…”

Section: Carbon Reduction Policy Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the Performance Management of Carbon Reduction by Local Governments from a Game Perspective—The Case of the Zhejiang Power Restriction Incident

Xiong,

Su,

2024

Sustainability

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The implementation of low-carbon development and carbon reduction has become an issue of general concern. When local governments adopt carbon reduction measures, they inevitably have a negative impact on the economic development of enterprises and the daily lives of residents. However, the resolution of conflicts of interest between local governments, enterprises, and residents will have a direct impact on the motivation and effectiveness of local governments in implementing carbon reduction measures. This study takes China as an example, conducts a case review of the actual situation of the Zhejiang power restriction incident, and studies and constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model based on the local government, enterprises, and residents. By exploring the factors that influence the behavioral strategies of each stakeholder, this study finds the equilibrium conditions that the tripartite governance target model must satisfy. It is suggested that interactive feedback from enterprises and residents should be incorporated into the performance management of local governments and that performance assessment should be used to establish an effective responsibility and pressure transmission mechanism to help the government’s internal control to better implement carbon reduction policies.

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Section: Carbon Reduction Policy Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the Performance Management of Carbon Reduction by Local Governments from a Game Perspective—The Case of the Zhejiang Power Restriction Incident

Xiong,

Su,

2024

Sustainability

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Internal revenue sharing methodology for virtual power plant clusters considering carbon incentive and penalty mechanisms

Gong,

Chen,

Shi

et al. 2024

JCM

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With the rapid development of renewable energy and the urgent need for global carbon emission reduction, virtual power plants have become a high-profile energy management model that can integrate multiple energy resources. How to effectively integrate renewable energy to reduce carbon emissions, how to optimize the use of different energy resources, and how to fairly distribute economic benefits within virtual power plant clusters while encouraging the reduction of carbon emissions are issues that need to be addressed in research. The study first established a virtual power plant model and conducted in-depth optimization for its economic and environmental indicators. Subsequently, the study constructed a game model within the virtual power plant cluster, aiming to solve the problem of income distribution in this diversified energy system. The research results found that commercial users have the highest carbon emissions, followed by industrial users, while residential users have the lowest carbon emissions. In terms of optimized user electricity consumption behavior, the peak-to-valley difference rate of industrial users has been reduced by 17%, and the daily load rate has increased by 6%; the peak-to-valley difference rate of commercial users has been reduced by 12%, and the daily load rate has increased by 6%; The peak-to-trough difference rate for residential users decreased by 8%, and the daily load rate increased by 4%. In addition, the research also proposes a method of internal revenue distribution of virtual power plant clusters based on a carbon reward and punishment mechanism, which provides a new way for the synergy effects and economic benefit distribution of virtual power plants. Research is of positive significance in solving pressing issues in the field of energy management and provides strong support for the development of future sustainable energy systems.

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Influence of the Government Department on the Production Capacity Reserve of Emergency Enterprises Based on Multi-Scenario Evolutionary Game

et al. 2022

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With the frequent occurrence of world emergency events, the emergency management of government departments in various countries is facing great challenges. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the shortage of various emergency resources is prominent, and the emergency supplies reserve combined by governments and enterprises is an important guarantee for dealing with emergency management problems. This paper mainly studies the impact of a government sustainability-oriented innovation policy on the production capacity reserve of security emergency enterprises (SEEs), and constructs an evolutionary game model between the local government and SEEs. Then, it focuses on the impact of a reputation mechanism on the government enterprise cooperative reserve. According to the condition of a country, the central government’s punishment mechanism is introduced, and the evolutionary and stable strategies of the behavior choices of the local government and SEEs are compared and analyzed. Combined with the evolution degree of emergency events, the numerical simulation analysis is used to deduce and simulate the multi scenario of the example model. The results show that the reputation mechanism can effectively promote the evolution of government and enterprises to the ideal state under various scenarios. When the punishment intensity of the central government is higher than the total benefit of the implementation of the mere formality policy by the local government, it can effectively prevent the omission of the local government. This study provides a new idea for the government to formulate reasonable policies to promote SEEs to reserve production capacity, which is more conducive to government enterprise cooperation to deal with emergency events.

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A Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Transportation Carbon Emission Reduction across Regions under Government Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Cited by 4 publications

References 38 publications

Research on the Performance Management of Carbon Reduction by Local Governments from a Game Perspective—The Case of the Zhejiang Power Restriction Incident

Research on the Performance Management of Carbon Reduction by Local Governments from a Game Perspective—The Case of the Zhejiang Power Restriction Incident

Internal revenue sharing methodology for virtual power plant clusters considering carbon incentive and penalty mechanisms

Influence of the Government Department on the Production Capacity Reserve of Emergency Enterprises Based on Multi-Scenario Evolutionary Game

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