A Trial Judge's Reflections on Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines

Abstract

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Preferences Toward Leniency under Mandatory Criminal Sentencing Guidelines: Role-in-the-Offense Adjustments for Federal Drug Trafficking Defendants

“…is not large, and corresponds with Weinstein's (1992) claim that a very small share of federal criminal sentencings-"fewer than five percent"-contained disputes over final offense level.…”

“…Specifically, I hypothesize that judges and/or prosecutors, wanting to reduce stiff guideline sentences, ceteris paribus gave defendants with higher base offense levels more lenient mitigating-role adjustments. This hypothesis is based on the assumption of judges' and prosecutors' disutility of sentence length, as anecdotally outlined in Weinstein (1992) and Schulhofer and Nagel (1997). Judges and prosecutors did not enjoy issuing long sentences, and exerted effort to shortening sentence by intensifying mitigating-role adjustments.…”

THE BOOKER DECISION AND DISCRIMINATION IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL SENTENCES

“…Results for the default group and for female defendants, who both experienced decreases in guideline‐conditional sentences but largely insignificant changes in baseline‐conditional and offense‐level‐unconditional sentences, are more complex. Leipold (2005) and Weinstein (1992) may help. These papers claim that, prior to Booker , some judges determined offense levels for personal reasons and not the legal standard of “preponderance of evidence.” Oftentimes, they intentionally kept an offense level low in order to shorten what they perceived to be a defendant's unjustly long prison sentence.…”

“…These papers claim that, prior to Booker , some judges determined offense levels for personal reasons and not the legal standard of “preponderance of evidence.” Oftentimes, they intentionally kept an offense level low in order to shorten what they perceived to be a defendant's unjustly long prison sentence. Leipold (2005) writes that judges had a “tendency to be influenced by the likely consequences when making decisions formally unrelated to the punishment,” and quotes Weinstein (1992), who writes that some judges, “with respect to facts that, if proved, would significantly enhance a defendant's sentence…would require clear and convincing evidence or, in some cases, proof beyond a reasonable doubt” instead of just preponderance of the evidence.…”