A Time-Series Analysis of Crime, Deterrence and Drug Abuse in New York City

Corman, Hope; Mocan, Naci

doi:10.2139/ssrn.159028

Cited by 79 publications

(102 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…Traditional economic models of crime predict an inverse relationship between criminal activity and economic opportunity, and between criminal activity and deterrence. This prediction is obtained from standard static models as well as more recent dynamic ones; and it is confirmed by empirical analyses (Mocan and Rees (forthcoming), Corman and Mocan (2005), Levitt (2002), Gould, Mustard and Weinberg (2002), Freeman and Rodgers (2000), Corman and Mocan (2000), Grogger (1998), and Levitt (1996)). One implicit assumption that prevails in theoretical and empirical work on crime is that the impact on crime of economic conditions (such as unemployment rate) and deterrence (such as the size of the police force) is symmetric.…”

Section: Asymmetric Crime Cyclessupporting

confidence: 68%

Asymmetric Crime Cycles

Bali

Mocan

2005

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Recent theoretical models based on dynamic human capital formation, or social influence, suggest an inverse relationship between criminal activity and economic opportunity and between criminal activity and deterrence, but predict an asymmetric response of crime. In this paper we use three different data sets and three different empirical methodologies to document this previously-unnoticed regularity. Using nonparametric methods we show that the behavior of property crime is asymmetric over time, where increases are sharper but decreases are gradual. Using aggregate time-series U.S. data as well as data from New York City we demonstrate that property crime reacts more (less) strongly to increases (decreases) in the unemployment rate, to decreases (increases) in per capita real GDP and to decreases (increases) in the police force. The same result is obtained between unemployment and property crime in annual state-level panel data. These results suggest that it may be cost effective to implement mechanisms to prevent crime commission rates from rising in the first place.

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Section: Asymmetric Crime Cyclessupporting

confidence: 68%

Asymmetric Crime Cycles

Bali

Mocan

2005

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“…Perhaps the most obvious policy tool (and that discussed at length in Durlauf and Nagin [2011]) with the strongest research base regarding impacts on crime concerns the expansion of local police forces. There is considerable empirical evidence of the general effectiveness of higher police staffing levels on crime (Chalfin and McCrary, 2012;Corman and NaciMocan, 2000;Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004;Evans and Owens, 2007). These studies consistently have found relatively large effects of expanding city police forces on local crime rates.…”

Section: Are These Effects Large?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Prison Downsizing and Public Safety

Lofstrom

Raphael

2016

Criminology & Public Policy

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“…Those studies confirm the general influence of harsh penalties applied to violent crimes (Levitt ). However, the fear of penalties is much less effective for victimless crimes such as drug dealing or drug use (Corman and Naci ; Kuziemko and Levitt ). In addition, an increase in the probability of being arrested is a far more effective deterrent than an increase in the severity of penalties (Levitt ).…”

Section: Traditional Public Goods Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Social Provision of Punishment and Incarceration

D’Amico¹

2017

American J Econ Sociol

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Standard economic theory proposes that public goods (equally available to everyone) will be underprovided by private markets. Individuals can benefit without having to pay, so there is little incentive to invest or manage resources efficiently. The punishment of criminals is an example of this, since everyone in a society benefits from reduced crime whether they pay to apprehend criminals or not. On that basis, it is widely presumed that governments must provide criminal justice services, including prisons. But the evidence in favor of that view is ambiguous. Stateless societies throughout history have found ways to maintain public order without ever building a prison. Nations with adequate social safety nets and a high degree of equality are also likely to rely on alternatives to incarceration. Strong forms of public goods theory, when applied to punishments and prisons, are shown to be false, since crime control does exist without a centralized state. Furthermore, the available evidence suggests that centralized government provision and management can also suffer inefficiencies from overproduction. Only comparative institutional analysis can speak to the efficiency potentials of punishment, wherein the costs of underproduction are assessed against the likely consequences of overproduction.

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A Time-Series Analysis of Crime, Deterrence and Drug Abuse in New York City

Cited by 79 publications

References 42 publications

Asymmetric Crime Cycles

Asymmetric Crime Cycles

Prison Downsizing and Public Safety

The Social Provision of Punishment and Incarceration

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