A Third Kind of Intellectual Virtue: Personalism

Battaly, Heather

doi:10.4324/9781315712550-11

Cited by 28 publications

(15 citation statements)

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“…Given the role that a person’s motivations toward epistemic goods play in this account of intellectual transparency, the acocunt is more at home within responsibilist or personalist approaches to intellectual virtue than with reliabilist approaches (cf. Battaly, 2019 ).…”

Section: An Account Of Group Intellectual Transparencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Group intellectual transparency: a novel case for non-summativism

Byerly

2022

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Philosophical reflection on transparency, including group transparency, is beginning to gain steam. This paper contributes to this work by developing a conceptualization of transparency as an intellectual character trait that groups can possess, and by presenting a novel argument for thinking that such transparency should be understood along non-summativist lines. According to the account offered, a group’s being intellectually transparent consists in the group’s tending to attend well to its perspective and to share its perspective faithfully with others in order to promote their epistemic goods. It is argued that this kind of group intellectual transparency, pace summativism, does not always consist merely in group members possessing intellectual transparency. The argument given for this conclusion works differently from existing arguments for non-summativism about group character traits, and it retains persuasive power even if summativist views of most group phenomena, including other group character traits, are correct.

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Section: An Account Of Group Intellectual Transparencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Group intellectual transparency: a novel case for non-summativism

Byerly

2022

Synthese

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“…Heather Battaly has developed a third view that combines elements of both responsibilism and reliabilism. The view, which she labels personalism, concurs with responsibilism that intellectual virtues must be cognitive character traits but rejects the responsibilist idea that intellectual virtues are necessarily praiseworthy or that we are necessarily (partly) responsible for possessing such virtues(Battaly 2018a).…”

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Neuromedia, cognitive offloading, and intellectual perseverance

Turner

2022

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This paper engages in what might be called anticipatory virtue epistemology, as it anticipates some virtue epistemological risks related to a near-future version of brain-computer interface technology that Michael Lynch (2014) calls 'neuromedia.' I analyze how neuromedia is poised to negatively affect the intellectual character of agents, focusing specifically on the virtue of intellectual perseverance, which involves a disposition to mentally persist in the face of challenges towards the realization of one’s intellectual goals. First, I present and motivate what I call ‘the cognitive offloading argument’, which holds that excessive cognitive offloading of the sort incentivized by a device like neuromedia threatens to undermine intellectual virtue development from the standpoint of the theory of virtue responsibilism. Then, I examine the cognitive offloading argument as it applies to the virtue of intellectual perseverance, arguing that neuromedia may increase cognitive efficiency at the cost of intellectual perseverance. If used in an epistemically responsible manner, however, cognitive offloading devices may not undermine intellectual perseverance but instead allow people to persevere with respect to intellectual goals that they find more valuable by freeing them from different kinds of menial intellectual labor.

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“…An intellectual virtue consists, roughly, of attitudes and dispositions for good and productive thinking(Ritchhart, 2002, pp.18-31). Intellectual virtues are typically acquired although the virtuous agent needn't be responsible for possessing them(Battaly, 2019).…”

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Argumentative Deliberation and the Development of Intellectual Humility and Autonomy in the Classroom

Brasi

2020

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It is argued that argumentative deliberation, which involves the interpersonal exchange and evaluation of reasons and counter-reasons, is crucial for the generation of epistemic goods given that it helps us eradicate errors and neutralise biases. However, to reap argumentative deliberation’s epistemic benefits, the deliberators need to instantiate a certain intellectual character: in particular, they need to be intellectually humble and autonomous. Given that, it is argued that the educational system should foster the development of the intellectual virtues of humility and autonomy. Moreover, some pedagogical strategies and practices as to how this can be achieved in the classroom are offered.

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A Third Kind of Intellectual Virtue: Personalism

Cited by 28 publications

References 1 publication

Group intellectual transparency: a novel case for non-summativism

Group intellectual transparency: a novel case for non-summativism

Neuromedia, cognitive offloading, and intellectual perseverance

Argumentative Deliberation and the Development of Intellectual Humility and Autonomy in the Classroom

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