A theory of presumption for everyday argumentation

Godden, David; Walton, Douglas

doi:10.1075/pc.15.2.06god

Cited by 43 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…5. As Godden and Walton (2007) put it, what Kauffeld proposes is an expectation-based theory of presumptions, thus naturally akin with the socio-cognitive notion of trust (Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2010). 6.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Both are old friends of any student of argumentation. Not to mention the fact that 'trust in relevance' seems oddly interchangeable with 'presumption of relevance', and presumptions in turn have a long scholarly tradition in argumentation theory (Godden & Walton, 2007;Kauffeld, 1998Kauffeld, , 2003Macagno & Damele, 2013;Walton, 1996Walton, , 2014a. So why should we embark in this complex analysis of trust in relevance, when more familiar analytical tools are available?…”

Section: Trust In Relevance: Does It Matter For Argumentation?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Trust, relevance, and arguments

Paglieri¹,

Castelfranchi²

2014

Argument & Computation

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This paper outlines an integrated approach to trust and relevance with respect to arguments: in particular, it is suggested that trust in relevance has a central role in argumentation. We first distinguish two types of argumentative relevance: internal relevance, i.e. the extent to which a premise has a bearing on its purported conclusion, and external relevance, i.e. a measure of how much a whole argument is pertinent to the matter under discussion, in the broader dialogical context where it is proposed. Then, we argue that judgements of internal relevance heavily rely on trust, and that such trust, although occasionally misplaced (e.g. in some so-called fallacies of relevance), is nonetheless based on several reasons, and thus often justified, by either epistemic or pragmatic considerations. We conclude by sketching potential methods to formally model trust in argumentative relevance, and briefly discussing the technological implications of this line of research.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Trust In Relevance: Does It Matter For Argumentation?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust, relevance, and arguments

Paglieri¹,

Castelfranchi²

2014

Argument & Computation

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“…Godden and Walton (2007) summarized several different theories of presumption in argumentation studies from Whately onwards. However, the approach taken in this paper defines presumption in terms of an inference with three components (Ullmann‐Margalit 1983, 147): (1) the presumption‐raising fact in a particular case at issue, (2) the presumption formula, i.e., a defeasible rule that sanctions the passage from the presumed fact to the conclusion, (3) the conclusion, a proposition that is presumed to be true on the basis of (1) and (2).…”

Section: The Two Dimensions Of Presumption: Defeasible Inference Smentioning

confidence: 99%

Presumptions in Legal Argumentation

Macagno

Walton

2012

Ratio Juris

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In this paper a theoretical definition that helps to explain how the logical structure of legal presumptions is constructed by applying the Carneades model of argumentation developed in artificial intelligence. Using this model, it is shown how presumptions work as devices used in evidentiary reasoning in law in the event of a lack of evidence to assist a chain of reasoning to move forward to prove or disprove a claim. It is shown how presumptions work as practical devices that may be useful in cases in which there is insufficient evidence to prove the claim to an appropriate standard of proof.

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“…Various researchers have investigated the connection between theories of rational proof and the law, putting legal concepts such as relevance (Anderson et al;Bex and Verheij 2013), burdens and standards of proof (Prakken and Sartor 2011;Bex and Walton 2012) and the presumption of innocence (Godden and Walton 2007) in an epistemological framework. Most of this existing research on combining evidential reasoning with legal reasoning focuses on criminal law and its related concepts.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evidence Assessment in Refugee Law with Stories and Arguments

Bex¹,

Bex-Reimert²

2016

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Abstract:In this article, we aim to analyse whether a systematic method for reasoning with evidence in legal cases -the hybrid theory of stories and arguments -can be applied to a novel legal domain, namely European asylum law. This analysis serves as a case study for testing the applicability of the hybrid theory outside of the context of criminal law. Furthermore, the analysis will provide insights on how the hybrid theory can be used to improve the normative framework for evidence assessment in asylum cases.Résumé: Dans cet article, nous visons à analyser si une méthode systématique de raisonner avec des preuves dans les affaires juridiquesla théorie hybride des histoires et des arguments -peut s'appliquer à un nouveau domaine juridique, à savoir le droit d'asile politique en Europe. Cette analyse est une étude de cas qui cherche à tester l'applicabilité de la théorie hybride hors du contexte du droit pénal. En outre, l'analyse permettra de mieux comprendre comment la théorie hybride peut être utilisée pour améliorer le cadre normatif employé pour évaluer des preuves dans les cas d'asile politique.

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A theory of presumption for everyday argumentation

Cited by 43 publications

References 23 publications

Trust, relevance, and arguments

Trust, relevance, and arguments

Presumptions in Legal Argumentation

Evidence Assessment in Refugee Law with Stories and Arguments

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