A theory of political gridlock

Abstract

This paper studies how electoral incentives influence the outcomes of political negotiations. It considers a game between two political parties that have to bargain over which policy to implement. While bargaining, the parties' popularity varies over time. Changes in popularity are partly exogenous and partly driven by the parties' actions. There is an election scheduled at a future date and the party with more popularity at the election date wins the vote. Electoral incentives can have substantial effects on bargaining outcomes. Periods of gridlock may arise when the election is close and parties have similar levels of popularity.

From Weber to Kafka: Political Instability and the Overproduction of Laws

“…Second, it could drop old reforms in a process aimed at reducing the number of laws and simplifying the legal system. Third, a reduction in the overproduction of laws could also be achieved by more political checks and balances that increase gridlock and political stalemate (see, e.g., Krehbiel 1996, Brady and Volden 1998, Callander 2011, Dziuda and Loeper 2016, Ortner 2017. The problem is that politicians have little incentive to support any of these policies, because with no reforms or by dropping outstanding reforms, politicians cannot signal their competence.…”

Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments

“…There is also a large political science literature that explores inefficient policy making due to structural characteristics of legislative decisionmaking (e.g., the filibuster or committee structure). Important examples here include Krehbiel () and Brady and Volden (), who explore models of gridlock, Ortner (), who shows that gridlock is likely near the next election, and Weingast et al () and Cox and McCubbins (), who analyze legislative structure and inefficient public good provision more generally. To our knowledge, however, there is as yet no analysis that focuses directly on the deliberate strategic choice of inefficient policy change when policy change occurs.…”

Gridlock and Inefficient Policy Instruments

“…There is also a large political science literature that explores inefficient policy making due to structural characteristics of legislative decisionmaking (e.g., the filibuster or committee structure). Important examples here include Krehbiel (1998) and Brady and Volden (2006), who explore models of gridlock, Ortner (2017), who shows that gridlock is likely near the next election, and Weingast et al (1981) and Cox and McCubbins (2000), who analyze legislative structure and inefficient public good provision more generally.…”