A theory of FOMC dissent voting with evidence from the time series

Havrilesky, Thomas; Schweitzer, Robert; Mayer, Thomas

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511571947.014

Cited by 61 publications

(58 citation statements)

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“…To motivate the issue of dissent voting, we re-visited the contribution of Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990), and applied it to the Bank of England's MPC. In addition to this, we rationalized why discrepancies between internal and external members might arise, and proposed the internal-external distinction was too simplistic: voting patterns exhibit considerable heterogeneity across all members.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Adolph (2005) uncovers similar findings, and more recently, Meade and Stasavage (2008) have introduced a role for career concerns, suggesting that members of a monetary policy committee are less likely to voice dissent when the transcripts of FOMC meetings are placed in the public domain. 2 As a primary motivation of this paper is to test the model of Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990), it is to their contribution which attention now briefly turns.…”

Section: Relationship To the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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A decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members

2010

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We examine the dissent voting record of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in its first decade. Probit estimates indicate the impact of career experience on dissent voting is negligible, whereas the impact of forecast inflation is pronounced. In addition to finding a role for dynamics, we also find a role for unobserved heterogeneity in the form of member-specific fixed-effects, suggesting previous literature characterizing voting behavior as largely determined by whether members are appointed from within or outside the ranks of Bank of England staff (internal and external members respectively) is overly simplistic.JEL Classification: C35, D7, E5.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Relationship To the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

A decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members

2010

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“…This theory generally assumes that political factors are important determinants of behaviour; more specifically, Democrats and Republicans occupy different points on the trade-off between unemployment and inflation, with Democrats presumed to be less attentive to inflation and more attentive to unemployme nt than Republicans. Numerous prior studies of Federal Reserve voting -including articles by Belden (1989), Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990), Havrilesky and Gildea (1991, 1992, 1995, and Gildea (1990Gildea ( , 1992 -have examined monetary policy votes cast by U.S. central bankers at the institutional hub, at the spokes, or both.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regional Influences on U.S. Monetary Policy: Some Implications for Europe

Meade

Sheets

2002

SSRN Journal

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This paper looks at the monetary policy decisions of the U.S. Federal Reserve and asks whether those decisions have been influenced solely by national concerns, or whether regional factors have played a role. All of the Federal Reserve's policymakers have some regional identity, i.e., either their positions explicitly carry some regional affiliation or their region of origin is a factor that must be considered in the selection process.This research is relevant for the Fed, and it may also be relevant for Europe's fledgling central bank in Frankfurt. Critics have asserted that ECB policymakers have an incentive to base policy on national developments and respond to national political pressures.We find that Fed policymakers do take into account developments in regional unemployment when deciding monetary policy, and that these regional developments are more important for central bankers at the hub than in the spokes. These findings are robust to a variety of different specifications of the voting equation.

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“…The hypothesis that the Chairman is dictatorial ('Y = 1.0) is consistently rejected, however. SchweItzer [1990) report SImilar results based on the estimatlOn of a bmary probit modeL However, Tootell [1991b) fails to find significant dIfferences between Governors and PreSIdents based upon a multmomiallogit analysIs See Havnlesky [1993] for a cntique of Tootell's analysis 30 Usmg aggregate reactlOn functlOns, Hakes [1990) found evidence of a shIft m reactIOn functlOn coeffiCIents under Arthur Burns (relative to Volcker and Martm). Belden [1989) also reports evidence of changing FOMC voting patterns under the Burns Chairmanship, however, her findings are challenged by Glidea [1991a] Havnlesky [1993) reports that under Burns the Fed systematically responded to AdmIlllstratlOn SIgnalS for monetary ease but not to sIgnals for tightness Thus, the apparent polley ShIftS under Burns mIght best be attnbuted to executive branch pressures 31.…”

Section: The Empirical Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%