A Theory of Categorical Terrorism

Abstract

When revolutionaries or insurgents, broadly defined, indiscriminately attack civilians, they generally attack "complicitous civilians," i.e., those categories of noncombatants which the revolutionaries see as benefiting from, supporting and/or having a substantial capacity to influence the states that the revolutionaries are attempting to displace or overthrow. Such "categorical" terrorism will be most extensive when revolutionaries view these states (or complicitous civilians themselves) as perpetrators of extensive, indiscriminate violence against the revolutionaries and their constituents. However, if significant numbers of complicitous civilians are seen by rebel groups as potential supporters (or as capable of being influenced by nonviolent appeals or protests), then they will not be indiscriminately attacked. Whether specific categories of civilians will be perceived as potential allies by revolutionaries depends mainly on the prior history of political interaction and cooperation between these civilians and the revolutionaries. Categorical terrorism is most likely where there has been little such interaction or cooperation, resulting in weak political alliances between the revolutionaries and complicitous civilians -for example, where the revolutionaries and complicitous civilians speak different languages, practice different religions, claim the same land, and/or are territorially segregated.The terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, have spurred many social scientists to explore the dynamics of terrorism, most for the first time. Before 9/11, terrorism research was the exclusive preserve, with very few exceptions, of small networks of political scientists and non-academic "security experts," relatively few of whom were interested in social-science theory. Descriptive case studies abound, replete with ad hoc, case-specific explanations of terrorism. Curiously, most scholars of rebellion and revolution have had virtually nothing of significance to say about terrorism. More generally, the strategic choices of social movements -of which terrorism is one -have received much less scholarly attention than the causes and consequences of such movements.In this article, I begin with a definition of terrorism and revolutionary terrorism; I then discuss several extant theories of terrorism, noting their insights and shortcomings; and I outline my own theory of "categorical" terrorism, a type of terrorism that has been employed by insurgents with increasing frequency in recent years. Although my theory requires more rigorous empirical testing than I can provide here, I believe that it helps to explain-better than extant approaches-why some revolutionary movements, but not others, employ or try to employ a strategy characterized by the use of violence against anonymous civilians or noncombatants who share a particular collective identity. It is terrorism in this sense which today alternately fascinates, repels and inspires women and men across large parts of the globe.

The Relational Approach to Terrorism

“…In fact, many if not most analysts, including myself (Goodwin 2006;also Richardson 2006), reserve the label "terrorism" exclusively for violence against noncombatants, a designation that has a basis in international law in the form of the doctrine of "noncombatant immunity". Terrorism in this sense would not include sabotage, guerrilla warfare, or counterinsurgency directed exclusively at armed rebels.…”

Defining and Theorizing Terrorism: A Global Actor-Centered Approach

“…A lot of the theoretical work on terrorism revolves around definitions (see the discussions in Cooper 2001;Gibbs 1989;Hoffman 1998: 13-15;Jenkins 2001;Ruby 2002;Schmid and Jongman 1988: 32-38; for a collection of definitions, see Goodwin 2006, table 1). For example, for Enders and Sandler "Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat of use of extranormal violence or brutality by subnational groups to obtain a political, religious, or ideological objective through intimidation of a huge audience, usually not directly involved with the policy making that the terrorists seek to influence " (2002:145-146, italics added).…”

“…differentiating civilian casualties produced by state armies as justifiable "collateral damage" from those produced by non-state agents), there is no qualitative characteristic of terrorist actions that would be sufficient to distinguish terrorism from other types of military or violent interaction or sufficient to distinguish violence-producing organizations that specialize in terrorism from other non-state affiliated violence-producing organizations (e.g., guerrillas). Restricting terrorism to the targeting of civilians and non-combatants for the purposes of political violence (Goodwin 2006), or the usage of violence in order to create an atmosphere of psychological and moral disorganization (Schmid and Jongman 1988), is not sufficient.…”

“…Using inconsistent definitions of the term is not helpful for a variety of reasons (see Gibbs 1989:329;Goodwin 2006Goodwin :2027Goodwin -2028. First, semantic vagueness has served to make it difficult for researchers to consistently study the phenomenon, as people use the same term to refer to a wide variety of events, ranging from state oppression and killing of civilians, to shootings in public places by lone gunmen.…”

Terrorism and Social Movements; Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, 2nd Edition

“…As such, researchers should study terrorism as a repertoire of contention, terrorism as a tactic, terrorism as an organizational attribute, terrorism as a category of violence, and so forth. To some extent, this is the strategy already employed by social movements scholars when they consider the phenomenon (Alimi et al 2015;Beck 2015;Della Porta 1995;Goodwin 2006;Olzak 2016;Tilly 2004). Building on this work may help articulate a more systematic agenda for the study of terrorism and provide entree for broader comparative research.…”