A Theoretical Basis for 19th-Century Changes to the Port of New York Imported Goods Auction

Engelbrecht‐Wiggans, Richard; Nonnenmacher, Tomas

doi:10.1006/exeh.1999.0717

Cited by 21 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…50 Second, eBay pioneered a feedback and rating system, imitated by other 48 See, for example, Cassady [1967], who quotes a 1937 law text on`pu¤ng', a synonym for shilling (p. 212). Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Nonnenmacher [1999] document that antishilling laws for the Port of New York date back to at least 1817. 49 For documentation of one such instance, see Sullivan [1999].…”

Section: Fraudmentioning

confidence: 98%

Auctions on the Internet: What’s Being Auctioned, and How?

Lucking-Reiley¹

2000

The J Industrial Economics

447

213

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This paper is an economist's guide to auctions on the Internet. It traces the development of online auctions since 1993, and presents data from a comprehensive study of 142 di¡erent Internet auction sites. The results describe the transaction volumes, the types of auction mechanisms used, the types of goods auctioned, and the business models employed at the various sites. These new electronic-commerce institutions raise interesting questions for the economic theory of auctions, such as predicting the types of goods to be sold at auction, examining the incentive e¡ects of varying auctioneer fee structures, and identifying the optimal auction formats for online sellers.

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Section: Fraudmentioning

confidence: 98%

Auctions on the Internet: What’s Being Auctioned, and How?

Lucking-Reiley¹

2000

The J Industrial Economics

447

213

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“…Incidents of shilling have also been reported in traditional English auctions for many years (see Cassady (1967) and Lucking-Reiley (2000)). In their study of how auctions affected trade at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Nonnenmacher (1999) reveal that this practice was widespread at that time. A change in New York's legislation in 1817 created disincentives for shillers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

The effect of shill bidding upon prices: Experimental evidence

Kosmopoulou

Silva

2007

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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“…The first use of this format outside of real estate seems to have been for ships, ship parts, and shipping gear, presumably during the seventeenth century. 17 By the early eighteenth century it was also commonly used to sell colonial goods and wine. 18 According to Philips (1924), use of this mechanism in auctions run by the VOC dates back to 1730.…”

Section: History Of the Anglo-dutch Premium Auctionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It seems that auctions were primarily used to sell off estates: the Amsterdam archive contains auction booklets mentioning the estate to which the securities belonged; the notarial deeds from the town of Utrecht similarly mention in many instances that the securities belonged to an estate. 20 Auctions were 17 See Noordkerk (1748). 18 Ricard (1722); Le Moine de l'Espine (1694-1801); Wegener Sleeswijk (2007).…”

Section: History Of the Anglo-dutch Premium Auctionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anglo-Dutch Premium Auctions in Eighteenth-Century Amsterdam

Boerner

Bochove²,

Quint

2012

SSRN Journal

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Abstract. An Anglo-Dutch premium auction consists of an English auction followed by a Dutch auction, with a cash premium paid to the winner of the first round.We study such auctions used in the secondary debt market in eighteenth-centuryAmsterdam. This was among the first uses of auctions, or any structured marketclearing mechanism, in a financial market. We find that this market presented two distinct challenges -generating competition and aggregating information. We argue that the Anglo-Dutch premium auction is particularly well-suited to do both.Modeling equilibrium play theoretically, we predict a positive relationship between the uncertainty in a security's value and the likelihood of a second-round bid. Analyzing data on 16,854 securities sold in the late 1700s, we find empirical support for this prediction. This suggests that bidding behavior may have been consistent with (non-cooperative) equilibrium play, and therefore that these auctions were successful at generating competition. We also find evidence suggesting that these auctions succeeded at aggregating information. Thus, the Anglo-Dutch premium auction appears to have been an effective solution to a complex early market design problem.JEL Classification: D44, N23

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A Theoretical Basis for 19th-Century Changes to the Port of New York Imported Goods Auction

Cited by 21 publications

References 6 publications

Auctions on the Internet: What’s Being Auctioned, and How?

Auctions on the Internet: What’s Being Auctioned, and How?

The effect of shill bidding upon prices: Experimental evidence

Anglo-Dutch Premium Auctions in Eighteenth-Century Amsterdam

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